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One of the most fundamental defenses to a criminal prosecution is that of
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege ("no crime without law, no
punishment without law") (NCSL). Notwithstanding that respect for NCSL is a
hallmark of modern national legal systems and a recurrent refrain in the
omnibus human rights instruments, international criminal law (ICL) fails to
fully implement this principle. The absence of a rigorous manifestation of NCSL
within ICL can be traced to the dawn of the field with the innovations employed
by the architects of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. In the face of NCSL
defenses, the judges of the Nuremberg Tribunal, in reasoning that was later
echoed by their brethren on the Tokyo Tribunal, rejected the defenses through a
complex interplay of arguments about immorality, illegality, and criminality.
These core arguments have been adapted to the modern ICL jurisprudence.
Where states failed to enact comprehensive ICL in the postwar period, ICL
judges have engaged in a full-scale-if unacknowledged-refashioning of ICL
through jurisprudence addressed to their own jurisdiction, the elements of
international crimes, and applicable forms of responsibility. Along the way,
courts have updated and expanded historical treaties and customary rules,
upset arrangements carefully negotiated between states, rejected political com-
promises made by states during multilateral drafting conferences, and added
content to vaguely worded provisions that were conceived more as retrospective
condemnations of past horrors than. as detailed codes for prospective penal
enforcement. A taxonomy of these analytical claims reveals the varied ways that
today's ICL defendants have been made subject to new or expanded criminal
law rules.
Collectively, these cases have the potential to raise acute concerns about
whether the rights of defendants are adequately protected in ICL. This, in turn,
raises important questions about the legitimacy of ICL as a field of criminal
law. This Article argues that the methodology developed by the European Court
of Human Rights to enforce the articulation of the NCSL principle in its
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constitutive document (the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) suggests that the NCSL jurisprudence has
not compromised the fundamental fairness of ICL. Rather, even where new
standards have been applied to past conduct, these cases have not infringed the
higher-order principles underlying the NCSL prohibition. Today's defendants
were on sufficient notice of the foreseeability of ICL jurisprudential innovations
in light of extant domestic penal law, universal moral values expressed in
international human rights law, developments in international humanitarian
law and the circumstances in which it has been invoked, and other dramatic
changes to the international order and to international law brought about in the
postwar period. As a prescriptive contribution, this Article argues that any
lingering concerns about the rights of the defendants can and should be
mitigated by sentencing practices-to a certain extent already in place and
employed by the ad hoc criminal tribunals-that are closely tethered to extant
domestic sentencing rules governing analogous domestic crimes.
Although focused on the NCSL jurisprudence, this Article also presents a
model of ICL formation and evolution that finds resonance in the origins and
gradual demise of the common law crime in the United States and elsewhere.
Common law crimes provided much of the substantive content for the nascent
Anglo-American criminal justice system until they were gradually supplanted by
legislative efforts. So too in ICL; common law international crimes have been
crucial to building the infrastructure of a truly international criminal justice
system. As in the domestic historical narrative, international crimes are increas-
ingly finding expression in more positivistic sources of law, thus obviating the
need for and diminishing the discretion of, international judges to make law in
the face of gaps or deficiencies. Collectively, the NCSL cases thus provide
insight into the dynamics of ICL argumentation, the interpretive attitudes of ICL
judges, and an emerging philosophy of the nature of ICL.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental defenses to a criminal prosecution is that of
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege ("no crime without law, no
punishment without law"). In its simplest translation, this Latin maxim asserts
the ex post facto prohibition: that conduct must be criminalized and penalties
fixed in advance of any criminal prosecution.1 More broadly, the maxim is also
invoked in connection with corollary legislative and interpretive principles
2
compelling criminal statutes to be drafted with precision (the principle of
specificity), to be strictly construed without extension by analogy, and to have
ambiguities resolved in favor of the accused (the principle of lenity or in dubio
pro reo). Together, these precepts undergird the principle of legality and serve
several purposes: ensuring that individuals are capable of obtaining notice of
prescribed conduct so they can rationally adjust their behavior to avoid sanc-
tion; protecting the citizenry from arbitrary or oppressive state action in the face
of ambiguities or gaps in the law; and effectuating the expressive purposes of
the law by clearly articulating conduct that is collectively condemned. The
principle of nullum crimen sine lege (NCSL) writ large thus embodies "an
1. German jurist Anselm Feuerbach is credited with coining the maxim. See PAuL JOHANN ANSELM
RITTER VON FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES GEMEINEN IN DEUTSCHLAND GiLTIGEN PEINUiCHEN REcsS (1801).
The concept, however, is far older than the maxim. Extant in ancient Roman and Greek law, NCSL is a
fundamental component of such seminal works of legal philosophy as St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa
Theologica. The nullum crimen sine lege principle experienced a resurgence in the Enlightenment
period, when the prevailing political ideology was one of reaction against oppressive government and
judicial arbitrariness. For a comprehensive treatment of the principle and its history, see MAGHTELD
BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMEs AGAINST HuMANrnT, WAR CRMEs: NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUJECr
MATrIER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL COURT 83-85 (2002); Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena
Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 165-70 (1937); and Aly Mokhtar, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine
Lege: Aspects and Prospects, 26 STATUTE L. REv. 41, 41-47 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, para. 93 (Dec. 5,
2003) (noting that nullum crimen sine lege encompasses principles of specificity and strict construc-
tion); Veeber v. Estonia (No. 2), App. No. 45771/99, paras. 30-31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 21, 2003),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.aspitem=9&portal=hbkm&action=html&
highlight= estonia&sessionid= 8778689&skin=hudoc-en (same).
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essential element of the rule of law' 3 by speaking to the very legitimacy of a
legal rule, providing a check on the power of all branches of government over
individuals, and policing the separation of powers by ensuring legislative
primacy in substantive rulemaking. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton recognized
violations of the principle as "the favorite and most formidable instruments of
tyranny."4
The principle of NCSL has constitutional significance in many national
systems.5 In American law, for example, the ex post facto clauses of the U.S.
Constitution constrain the legislative branches of the federal and state govern-
merits from enacting retroactive legislation. 6 The Framers had particular histori-
cal tyrannies in mind in constitutionalizing the twin prohibitions against ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder.7 At the time of the U.S. founding, the courts
were perceived as less of a threat to the values underlying NCSL, because the
"opportunity for discrimination is more limited than the legislature's, in that
[courts] can only act in construing existing law in actual litigation." 8 Instead,
American law addresses adjudicative retroactivity primarily through the "fair
warning requirement" found implicit in the Due Process Clauses.9 Within
international law, the principle of NCSL is embodied in all of the omnibus
human rights instruments. 10 These human rights treaty provisions are directed to
all branches of the governments of states parties, although in practice, they are
most often invoked in reaction to judicial action enforcing ex post legislation or
reinterpreting existing rules. In contradistinction, the principle is not featured in
3. Jorgi6 v. Germany, App. No. 74613/01, para. 10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 12, 2007), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpI97/view.asp?item= 1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight= 74613/
01&sessionid=8779548&skin=hudoc-en; see HERBERT PACKER, THE LBvnTs OF CRMINAL SANCION
79-80 (1968) (describing NCSL as "the first principle" of the criminal law).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511-12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5. For a comparative study of NCSL in domestic law, see BOOT, supra note 1, at 81-126 and
KENNETH S. GALLANT, THm PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND CoMPARATIVE CRIuINAL LAW
(forthcoming Nov. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed."); id.
§ 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law .... ). The ex post facto
clauses include a constellation of prohibitions against legislative acts that: (1) make criminal an
innocent action done before the passing of the law; (2) aggravate a crime; (3) inflict a greater
punishment than the law stated at the time the crime was committed; or (4) alter the legal rules of
evidence to allow for less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offence to convict the offender. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
7. Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal
Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 455, 462 (2001) (noting Framers' concerns with Great Britain's passage of
ex post facto laws and bills of attainder to attack unpopular groups and individuals).
8. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.3 (1961). Indeed, the ex post facto clauses do not
speak to the judicial power at all. See Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 162 (1913) ("[T]he provision is
directed against legislative, but not judicial, acts."). The U.S. Supreme Court has resisted the extension
of the ex post facto clauses to courts. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 467 (2001) (upholding a
court's action as the "routine exercise of common law decisionmaking in which the court brought the
law into conformity with reason and common sense").
9. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at art. 11(2), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also infra Part I.
[Vol. 97:119
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the statutes governing the modem international criminal law tribunals, with the
exception of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
Notwithstanding that respect for NCSL is a hallmark of modem national legal
systems and a recurrent refrain in human rights instruments, international
criminal law (ICL) fails to fully implement this supposed tool against tyranny.
The absence of a rigorous manifestation of NCSL within ICL can be traced to
the dawn of the field. In the post-World War II (WWII) period, the victorious
Allies essentially held German and Japanese sovereignty "in trust" as postwar
occupiers." In the exercise of their legislative authority, the Allies renounced
suggestions from within that the Axis leaders be summarily executed. Instead,
they established international criminal tribunals to prosecute German and Japa-
nese defendants-"one of the most significant tributes that power has ever paid
to reason."' 2 The Charters governing these Tribunals were the source of new
rules of international law that were immediately, 13 and then intermittently
thereafter, 14 impugned for their retroactive application. As those historic proceed-
ings drew to a close, the international community of states initiated a number of
drafting exercises to codify the Nuremberg principles. Many of these efforts,
however, were either indelibly compromised by polarized negotiations or aban-
doned during the Cold War period. Those projects that were finalized were
generally never fully implemented within domestic legal systems.
Where the international community of states-still the primary source of
legislative authority in international law-failed to enact comprehensive ICL
either internationally or domestically, judicial institutions have undertaken the
responsibility of developing the law and, in so doing, raised the most acute
concerns about compliance with the precepts of NCSL. In the post-Cold War
renaissance of ICL, international and domestic criminal courts have stepped in
to develop and modernize the law born of the WWII era. In this process, courts
are actively engaged in applying new ICL norms to past conduct. This is not the
demure application of a judicial gloss to established doctrine. Rather, these
tribunals are engaging in a full-scale refashioning of ICL through jurisprudence
addressed to their own jurisdiction, the elements of international crimes, and
applicable forms of responsibility. Along the way, courts are updating and
expanding historical treaties and customary prohibitions, upsetting arrange-
ments carefully negotiated between states, rejecting political compromises made
11. George A. Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 22 (1947).
12. Robert H. Jackson, OPENING STATEMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ON THE SUBJECr OF
INTERNATIONAL MIuTARY TRmuNAL No. I (Nov. 21, 1945), reprinted in 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CPmuNALs BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MIUTARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NovEMBER 1945-1 OCrOBER
1946, at 98, 99.
13. See, e.g., Finch, supra note 11, at 28. But see Lord Wright, War Crimes Under International
Law, 62 L.Q. REv. 40 (1946) (arguing in favor of the legality of the proceedings).
14. See, e.g., Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 830, 832-34
(2006) (recounting criticism).
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by states during multilateral drafting conferences, and adding content to vaguely
worded provisions that were conceived more as retrospective condemnations of
past horrors than as detailed codes for prospective penal enforcement. All told,
in the wake of cataclysmic events, judges have expanded the reach of ICL, even
at the expense of fealty to treaty drafters' original intentions and in the absence
of positive law that might ensure formal advance notice of proscribed conduct.
As a result, the invocation of NCSL has been practically ubiquitous in the ICL
context as criminal defendants attempt to stem this jurisprudential tide. And yet,
the defense has proven to be a rather porous barrier to prosecution. Given that
the principle of NCSL is an integral part of the human rights canon, this
adjudicative trend raises acute concerns about whether the rights of defendants
are adequately protected in ICL. This, in turn, raises important questions about
the legitimacy of ICL as a field of criminal law.
This Article addresses these issues in three Parts. Part I starts with the
reasoning of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals-the Aristotelian "prime
movers" in the field of ICL. Part II then updates these arguments with reference
to exemplary cases in the modem jurisprudence. Building off the historical
materials, this Part develops a taxonomy of recurring lines of reasoning and
methodological choices employed by modem ICL tribunals in the face of NCSL
defenses. In these cases, some tribunals accept the applicability of the principle
of NCSL and purport to rule in compliance with it; others deny its applicability
under the particular circumstances presented. In all these cases, defendants are
made subject to new or expanded criminal law rules.
Part I1 evaluates these judicial decisions collectively against the rights of
criminal defendants as set out in the web of human rights treaties articulating
the NCSL principle. This Part contains the Article's normative claim: the
expansive interpretive approach undertaken by modern ICL judges has not
compromised the fundamental fairness of modem ICL proceedings. Rather,
even where new standards have been applied to past conduct, ICL judges have
not infringed the higher-order principles underlying the NCSL prohibition.
Today's defendants were on sufficient notice of the foreseeability of ICL
jurisprudential innovations in light of extant domestic penal law, universal
moral values expressed in international human rights law, developments in
international humanitarian law and the circumstances in which this law has been
invoked, and other dramatic changes to the international order and to interna-
tional law brought about in the postwar period. As a prescriptive contribution, this Part
argues that any lingering concerns about the rights of the defendants can and should
be mitigated by sentencing practices-to a certain extent already in place and em-
ployed by the ad hoc criminal tribunals-that are closely tethered to extant domestic
sentencing rules governing analogous domestic crimes.
Although focused on NCSL jurisprudence, this Article also presents a model
of ICL formation and evolution that finds resonance in the origins and gradual
[Vol. 97:119
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demise of the common law crime.1 5 Common law crimes provided much of the
substantive content for the nascent Anglo-American criminal justice system
until they were gradually supplanted by legislative efforts.' 6 So too in ICL;
common law international crimes-as developed and elaborated upon in the
cases discussed herein-have been crucial to preparing the way for a truly
international criminal justice system. As in the domestic historical narrative,
international crimes are increasingly finding expression in more positivistic
sources of law, thus obviating the need for, and diminishing the discretion of,
international judges to make law in the face of gaps or deficiencies. Collec-
tively, the NCSL cases teach volumes about the dynamics of ICL argumenta-
tion, the interpretive attitudes of its judges (even those trained in the Civilist-
Germanic tradition), and an emerging philosophical perspective on the nature of
international criminal law. In particular, this Article reveals that when ICL
judges find themselves at the "point of intersection between law and morals," 17
they lean decidedly toward the latter.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE JURISPRUDENCE
The principle of NCSL entered the field of ICL on uncertain footing and was
immediately distinguished. In the post-WWII period, NCSL was at the heart of
the defendants' challenge to the legality of the near-identical Charters governing
the international military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The victorious
Allies could have easily relied solely on the well-established constellation of
war crimes prohibitions to prosecute the WWII defendants. Instead, they opted
to innovate and assert jurisdiction over two additional crimes, not theretofore
codified: crimes against the peace (the crime of aggression in today's lexicon)
and crimes against humanity. War crimes, while deserving of opprobrium, did
not fully capture the Nazi atrocities, which radiated outward in acts of aggres-
sion and penetrated inward as persecutory pogroms against compatriots.
First in the dock, the Nuremberg defendants attacked the novel crimes against
15. The Justice Case, brought immediately following the Nuremberg proceedings against Nazi
jurists held responsible for implementing the Nazi "racial purity" program through the implementation
of eugenic laws, also invoked this comparison between ICL and the common law when the tribunal
stated:
International law is not the product of statute. Its content is not static. The absence from the
world of any governmental body authorized to enact substantive rules of international law has
not prevented the progressive development of that law. After the manner of the English
common law it has grown to meet the exigencies of changing conditions.
United States v. Altstotter, reprinted in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CP McNALs BEFORE THE NuERNBERG MILrARY
TRiBuNAL UNDER COMNTOL CouNCrI. LAW No. 10, at 954, 966 (1951) [hereinafter Justice Case].
16. Common law crimes emerged in the United Kingdom through the mid-seventeenth century. At
this time, legislatures met infrequently and judges regularly confronted harmful conduct without
proscriptive statutes. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTN W. ScoTr, JR., SuBSTANTwvE CRIMINAL LAW 103
(1986).
17. ALEXANDER PAsstA~N D'ENTRivES, NATURAL LAw 116 (2d ed. 1952).
2008]
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the peace charge most vociferously,18 arguing-accurately-"that no sovereign
power has made aggressive war a crime at the time that the alleged criminal acts
were committed, that no statute had defined aggressive war, that no penalty had
been fixed for its commission, and no court had been created to try and punish
offenders."' 9 In its final judgment, the Nuremberg Tribunal initially dodged the
defense, reasoning simply that the law of the Charter-as the manifestation of
the sovereign legislative power of the victorious Allies-was "decisive" and
"binding upon the Tribunal., 20 Notwithstanding the undeniable novelty of two
out of the three crimes prosecuted at Nuremberg, the Tribunal declared that the
Charter was "the expression of international law existing at the time of [the
Charter's] creation.,, 21 Thus, when considering the crimes against the peace
charge, the Tribunal asserted that it was not "strictly necessary to consider
whether and to what extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution of
the London Agreement. '" 22 .
Notwithstanding this available "out," the Tribunal did address the defense on
the merits, albeit technically in obiter dicta, "in view of the great importance of
the questions of law involved., 2 3 In so doing, the Tribunal ultimately neutral-
ized the defense through a trilogy of analytical claims. The first move qualified
the very application of the maxim, which the Tribunal argued is "not a limita-
tion on sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice."24 Identifying NCSL
as a principle of justice implied that the Allied states could override the
principle in the collective exercise of their executive, legislative, and judicial
powers in German territory.25
Second, the Tribunal concluded that because the conduct was unquestionably
wrong, it was also unlawful under international law. The Tribunal pointed to
extant treaties, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact 26 and various bilateral treaties
18. Interestingly, the defendants' motion did not address the novelty of the crimes against humanity
charge at all. See Motion Adopted by All Defense Counsel on 19 November 1945, in 1 TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE Ta INRATIONAL MEurrARY TautuAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER
1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 168-70 (1947).
19. Judgment, 22 TRAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALs BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBU-
NAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NovEmBER 1945-1 OcroBER 1946, at 462 (1948) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judg-
ment].




24. Id. at 462.
25. The French translation of the judgment disarms the defense even more, stating "nullum crimen
sine lege ne limite pas la souverainet6 des ltats; elle ne formule qu'une r~gle generalment suivie"--that
is, NCSL "is not a limitation on the sovereignty of states; it only expresses a generally followed rule."
There are other translation discrepancies in the versions of this passage of the opinion. See Susan
Lamb, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law in 1 THE ROME STATuE
OF a INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COtURT: A COMMENTARY 733, 737 n.13 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
2002).
26. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928,
46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
[Vol. 97:119
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of neutrality and non-aggression, to reason that general international law prohib-
ited the charged acts of aggression. From here, the Tribunal took its third leap
by equating illegality with criminality. It reasoned that the Pact, with its
"solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy[,] necessarily
involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that
those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible conse-
quences, are committing a crime in so doing. 27 In so arguing, the Tribunal
transformed a treaty devoted to the regulation of state conduct (providing as a
sanction that the state in question would "be denied the benefits furnished by",
28
the Pact and thus render itself vulnerable to reprisals and claims for reparations)
into one regulating individual conduct by providing penal sanctions.29 The
treaty's renunciation of war ipso facto rendered war unlawful under general
international law, and the illegality of war under general international law ipso
facto rendered the pursuit of war a crime under international law.30 In this way,
the launching of aggressive war in Europe became an international crime over
and above a breach of an obligation of a contractual nature. The Tribunal
concluded: "On this view of the case alone, it would appear that the maxim
[NCSL] has no application to the present facts." 31
To support this conflation of illegality and criminality, the Tribunal invoked
the long history of war crimes prosecutions for acts now prohibited by the 1907
Hague Conventions,32 such as the mistreatment of prisoners of war and the use
27. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at 463.
28. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 26, at pmbl.
29. Telford Taylor, a key member of the U.S. prosecutorial team, anticipated this correlation in an
early memorandum on trial strategy in which he wrote:
Only the most incorrigible legalists can pretend to be shocked by the conclusion that the
perpetrator of an aggressive war acts at peril of being punished for his perpetration, even if no
tribunal has ever previously decided that perpetration of an aggressive war is a crime. And, in
any event, the ex post facto question is rendered much easier by the fact of treaty viola-
tion... a man who violates a treaty must act at peril of being punished by the offending
party's employing self-help.
ThLFoRD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERO TRIALs 51 (1992).
30. The Tribunal contended that criminal prosecutions were justified because the defendants could
not have reasonably thought their conduct was lawful and it would be unjust to exonerate responsible
individuals. It argued:
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have
attacked neighboring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances,
the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him,
it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.
Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at 462. Tribunals established pursuant to Control Council Law
No. 10 in the allied zones of occupation echoed this certainty: "There is no doubt of the criminality of
the acts with which the defendants are charged. They are based on violations of International Law well
recognized and existing at the time of their commission." The German High Command Trial, in 12 LAW
REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRMIuNALS 62 (1949).
31. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at 462.
32. The 1899 Hague Conventions, signed but never ratified, addressed themselves to the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I), the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II),
2008]
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of poisonous weapons, notwithstanding that those Conventions are silent as to
individual criminal responsibility for breaches.33 The Tribunal noted that:
Many of these prohibitions have been enforced long before the date of the
Convention; but since 1907 they have certainly been crimes, punishable as
offenses against the laws of war; yet the Hague Convention nowhere desig-
nates such practices as criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any
mention made of a court to try and punish offenders. For many years past,
however, military tribunals have tried and punished individuals guilty of
violating the rules of land warfare laid down by this Convention. 34
Accordingly, the Tribunal reasoned that if the Hague Conventions could give
rise to penal consequences, so too could the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Relatedly, the
Tribunal argued, if war crimes-as part of the jus in bello--existed without
express conventional authorization, then, a fortiori, there must also be jus ad
bellum: "those who wage aggressive war are doing that which is equally illegal"
and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the Hague
Convention. 35 With this series of logical leaps, the defendants' primary defense was
rejected, and the Tribunal rendered judgment on all counts in the indictment.
Given the novelty at the time of the application of individual criminal
responsibility to any violations of international law, the presumed link between
Maritime Warfare (Hague III), the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons (Hague IV,
1), Asphyxiating Gases (Hague IV, 2), and Expanding Bullets (Hague IV, 3). In 1906, delegates
reconvened in The Hague to draft additional treaties, which have superseded their predecessors and
expanded consideration to the Opening of Hostilities (Hague III), the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V), the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the
Outbreak of Hostilities (Hague VI), the Laying of Submarine Automatic Contact Mines (Hague VIII),
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX), and the Discharge of Projectiles and
Explosives from Balloons (Hague XIV). The most important treaty to emerge from this latter Confer-
ence was undoubtedly the fourth "Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land." Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 2
(limiting the means and methods of warfare) [hereinafter 1907 Hague (IV) Convention].
33. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at 463. Article 3 of the 1907 Hague (IV) Convention
provides that a belligerent in violation of the treaty "shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed
forces." The treaties do not contemplate penal sanctions. 1907 Hague (IV) Convention, supra note 32,
at art. 3.
34. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at 463. For support, the Tribunal cited the now infamous
Quirin case before the U.S. Supreme Court for the proposition that "[f]rom the very beginning of its
history this Court has applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which
prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as enemy
individuals." Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942); see Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at
465.
35. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at 463; see also id. at 186 (finding a war of aggression to
be "the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself
the accumulated evil of the whole"). This concept finds expression in Justice Jackson's observation that
war is "the crime that comprehends all lesser crimes." Robert H. Jackson, Report to the President (June
6, 1945), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TIALS REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS: LONDON, 1945 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1949),
available at http://www.yale.edulawweb/avalon/imt/jackson/jack08.htm [hereinafter Jackson Report].
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immorality, illegality, and criminality was tenuous. In fact, the inclusion of
crimes against the peace in the Charters was hotly contested during the Tribu-
nals' creation. During the negotiations over the crimes to be charged and their
definition, the Soviet and French delegations resisted the inclusion of crimes
against the peace in the Charter of the future tribunal.3 6 The French delegate,
Professor Andr6 Falco, harkened back to the decision following World War I
(WWI)--driven largely by a prior American delegation-to reject the idea of a
crime of aggression. Given this precedent, Falco worried that its inclusion now
would constitute ex post facto legislation.37 Eventually, these differences in
opinion were overcome-primarily due to the tenacity of Justice Robert H. Jackson of
the U.S. delegation--and the American position and formulation of the crime pre-
vailed in the Nuremberg Charter and was reproduced in the Tokyo Charter.
Although the offense of crimes against humanity was almost equally as novel
as that of crimes against the peace, it provoked less consternation among the
defendants and less overt angst within the Tribunal. The cognizability of such
crimes had been contemplated, but rejected, in the post-WWI period in connec-
tion with the Ottoman Empire's massacres and deportations of its Armenian
subjects, among other atrocities of that war.38 Two decades before the establish-
ment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the American delegation to the conference
designing the post-WWI prosecutorial strategy argued that crimes against human-
ity were nonjusticiable, regardless of how iniquitous the acts were. In written
comments, the delegation reasoned:
The laws and customs of war are a standard certain, to be found in books of
authority and in the practice of nations. The laws and principles of humanity
vary with the individual, which, if for no other reason, should exclude them
from consideration in a court of justice, especially one charged with the
administration of criminal law.3 9
This position prevailed, and the final document-which was never fully imple-
mented-did not advocate prosecutions for crimes against humanity.
It was thus left to the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter to establish crimes
against humanity in positive law. The Nuremberg Tribunal, perhaps recognizing
36. TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 65-66.
37. Id. at 66.
38. In 1915, the Allied governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia issued a joint declaration to
the Ottoman Empire denouncing the massacres of Armenians as "crimes against humanity and
civilization for which all the members of the Turkish Government will be held responsible together
with its agents implicated in the massacres." Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRn. YB.
INT'L L. 178, 181 (1946) (quoting Armenian Memorandum Presented by the Greek Delegation to the
Commission of Fifteen on March 14, 1919).
39. Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United States to the
Report of the Comm'n on Responsibilities (Apr. 4, 1919), Annex II, reprinted in Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the
Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 134 (1920).
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that the legality of the charge was suspect, interpreted its Charter restrictively to
require that crimes against humanity be charged only in connection with one of
the other crimes within the Tribunal's jurisdiction-that is, crimes against the
peace or war crimes. Specifically, the Tribunal held:
To constitute Crimes against Humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak
of the war must have been in execution of, or in connection with, any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that
revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfacto-
rily proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any
such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration that the
acts before 1939 were Crimes against Humanity within the meaning of the
Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939, War Crimes were
committed on a vast scale, which were also Crimes against Humanity; and
insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the Indictment, and committed after
the beginning of the war, did not constitute War Crimes, they were all
committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive war, and
therefore constituted Crimes against Humanity.n°
In this way, the Tribunal disregarded language in the Charter definition that
crimes against humanity could be committed "before or during the war' 41 and
essentially. conflated the war crimes and crimes against humanity counts and
allegations. Unlike its lengthy exegesis with respect to the legality of crimes
against the peace, the Tribunal did not otherwise justify the crimes against
humanity charge.4 2 Thus, just as it announced an expansive crime of aggression,
the Tribunal significantly limited the reach of crimes against humanity. Because
both charges implicated the NCSL principle in almost equal measure, the
Nuremberg Tribunal's disparate approach can perhaps best be explained as an
attempt to limit the incursion on state sovereignty occasioned by crimes against
humanity, which establish the international criminality of peacetime acts against
compatriots.43
The Tokyo Charter, the product of a special proclamation issued by the
Supreme Allied Commander of the Far East-U.S. General Douglas
MacArthur-assigned virtually the same subject matter jurisdiction to the To-
kyo Tribunal." Not surprisingly, the Japanese defendants asserted arguments in
40. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at 249.
41. For a fuller discussion of the origins, impact, and demise of the "war nexus" requirement for
crimes against humanity, see generally Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity:
Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLtM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999).
42. The American judge at Nuremberg, Judge Biddle, later justified the limited approach to crimes
against humanity as being "highly desirable" in light of the then-prevailing "stage of the development
of international law." Francis Biddle, The Nurnberg Trial, 33 VA. L. REv. 679, 695 (1947).
43. See Van Schaack, supra note 41, at 846-47 (noting that the notion of crimes against humanity
made inroads into traditional domains rdservis of states).
44. United States v. Araki et al., Judgment and Annexes, in 20 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMEs TLL
48,436 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981).
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preliminary proceedings similar to those raised by their brethren at Nuremberg.
With respect to the crimes against the peace charge, they too argued that war as
an act of state was not illegal under international law and thus not subject to
penal condemnation.45 At the time, the motion was dismissed,46 but the defen-
dants had to await the final judgment for the Tribunal's reasons. It was no doubt
hardly worth the wait as the Tribunal laconically adopted the reasoning of the
Nuremberg Tribunal:
In view of the fact that in all material respects the Charters of this Tribunal
and the Nuremberg Tribunal are identical, this Tribunal prefers to express its
unqualified adherence to the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal
rather than by reasoning the matters anew in somewhat different language to
open the door to controversy by way of conflicting interpretations of the two
statements of opinions.47
In his separate opinion in the Tokyo proceedings, Justice Roling of the
Netherlands concluded that aggressive war was not a crime prior to the enact-
ment of the two Charters. Nonetheless, he dismissed the ex post facto argument
by reasoning that the victorious allies were entitled to disregard the NCSL
principle as a matter of policy:
If the principle of "nullum crimen sine praevia lege" ["no crime without
previously declared law"] were a principle of justice,. . . the Tribunal would
be bound to exclude for that very reason every crime created in the Charter ex
post facto, it being the first duty of the Tribunal to mete out justice. However,
this maxim is not a principle of justice but a rule of policy, valid only if
expressly adopted, so as to protect citizens against arbitrariness of courts... as
well as the arbitrariness of legislators .... [T]he prohibition of ex post facto
law is an expression of political wisdom, not necessarily applicable in present
international relations. This maxim of liberty may, if circumstances necessi-
tate it, be disregarded even by powers victorious in a war fought for free-
dom.48
In Rling's estimation, the victorious states had a right-if not a duty-to
neutralize threats to international peace and to ensure the non-repetition of
conduct that disrupted the newly established order.49 Indeed, according to
Roling, the Allies could have responded with raw power rather than law to
achieve this aim. "That the judicial way is chosen.., is a novelty which cannot
be regarded as a violation of international law in that it affords the vanquished
45. Id. at 48,436-436a.
46. Id. at 48,437.
47. Id. at 48,439.
* 48. United States v. Araki et aL, Separate Opinion of Judge Roling, in 21 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR
CRIMES TRLAL 44-45A (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981).
49. Id. at 46.
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more guarantees than mere political action could do."' 0 In Judge Roling's mind,
the imperatives of necessity and security overrode any resistance exerted by the
NCSL principle.
Justice Pal of India, in his famously sprawling dissent, declared that the
Tokyo Tribunal was free, indeed obligated, to disregard the provisions of the
Charter if they diverged from pre-existing international law. Otherwise, he
reasoned, the Tribunal would be "a mere tool for the manifestation of power":51
The so-called trial held according to the definition of crime now given by the
victors obliterates the centuries of civilization which stretch between us and
the summary slaying of the defeated in a war. A trial with law thus proscribed
will only be a sham employment of legal process for the satisfaction of a thirst
for revenge. It does not correspond to any idea of justice.52
In Justice Pal's estimation, a victor nation's legislating new law for the van-
quished was not only contrary to the rule against the retroactivity of law, but
also a usurpation of power.
Justice Pal also took issue with the majority's resort to customary interna-
tional law to compensate for the lack of more comprehensive treaty law. In
particular, he noted that much state conduct went against the rule articulated by
the majority, and that "[clustomary law does not develop only by pronounce-
ments. 53 He concluded, accordingly, that "[w]hen the conduct of the nations is
taken into account the law will perhaps be found to be that only a lost war is a
crime.",54 To the extent that any custom may have been developing, he argued, it
was directed at sovereign states and not individuals.55 Justice Pal questioned the
wisdom of a system of individual responsibility that applied only to the van-
quished, arguing that such censure could not promote genuine deterrence:
56
"[flear of being punished by the future possible victor for violating a rule which
that victor may be pleased then to formulate would hardly elicit any apprecia-
tion of the values behind that norm."
5 7
In this way, the postwar tribunals approached the principle of NCSL some-
what inconsistently and with caution.58 Although the judges did not dismiss the
50. Id. at 47.
51. United States v. Araki et aL, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pal, in 21 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR
CRiMEs TRIAL 36-37 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981).
52. Id. at 37.
53. Id. at 123-26; see also id. at 152 ("War itself, as before remained outside the province of law, its
conduct only having been brought under legal regulations. No customary law developed so as to make
any war a crime.").
54. Id. at 128.
55. Id. at 180.
56. Id. at 214.
57. Id. at 215.
58. Military tribunals proceeding on the basis of Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL 10), which was
enacted to provide a uniform basis for the trial of lesser defendants in occupation courts, generally
adopted the same reasoning employed by the two international tribunals when confronted with claims
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defense summarily, they did significantly limit its impact vis-4-vis the crimes
against the peace charge. At the same time, their reasoning with respect to
crimes against humanity-and in particular their truncation of the concept-
suggests that the principle was not entirely absent from their deliberations. This
may be due to the fact that crimes against the peace had some grounding in
extant treaties. Furthermore, crimes against humanity are more revolutionary in
that they embody the beginnings of a universal moral code addressing the way
in which states may treat their citizens and thus intrude more acutely into
prerogatives of state sovereignty recognized since the-Peace of Westphalia. The
limitations on the definition of crimes against humanity adopted by the Nurem-
berg Tribunal ensured that its jurisprudence enabled such intrusions only in
connection with the commission of aggressive war or war crimes. As discussed
in the next Part, in many ways, the two Tribunals set the terms for future
adjudications of NCSL before modem ICL tribunals. Today's tribunals adjudicat-
ing ICL borrow heavily from the Nuremberg precedent and reasoning in ruling
on the applicability and impact of the principle of NCSL in proceedings before
them.
II. NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Fast forward to the 1990s and the establishment of the two ad hoc interna-
tional criminal tribunals and subsequent hybrid tribunals. Proving the old adage
that "there is nothing new under the sun,"5 9 tribunals adjudicating ICL today
borrow heavily from the Nuremberg reasoning. In ruling on the applicability
and impact of the principle of NCSL in proceedings before them, modem
tribunals invoke a complex interplay among immorality, illegality, and criminal-
ity. The principle is invoked in varied circumstances. In some cases, defendants
have sought to impugn what they consider to be new definitions of crimes and
forms of participation set forth in the tribunals' constitutive statutes. In other
proceedings, defendants have contested expansive applications of dated law to
address modem atrocities. The tribunals have employed multiple responses to
reject the applicability of NCSL and its constitutive principles. Some tribunals
purport to be acting in actual or substantial compliance with the dictates of the
NCSL principle. Other opinions imply that NCSL is inapplicable or inapposite.
that CCL 10 constituted ex post facto legislation. United States v. Ohlendorf et al., 4 TRiAL OF WAR
CRiMINALS BEFORE nm NuERNBERG M rrARY TRIuNALs UNDER COMNROL CouNciL No. 10, at 458-59
(1951) ("Control Council Law No. 10 is but the codification and systematization of already existing
legal principles, rules, and customs .... Certainly no one can claim with the slightest pretense at
reasoning that there is any taint of ex post factoism in the law of murder."). Likewise, in the Justice
Case, the court noted: "The ex post facto rule cannot apply in the international field as it does under
constitutional mandate in the domestic field." Justice Case, supra note 15, at 974-75. NCSL was
unsuccessfully raised as a defense in several subsequent domestic proceedings beyond the immediate
postwar period (most notably in the Eichmann case), but the Nuremberg reasoning was largely followed
and "no new arguments were adduced." Lamb, supra note 25, at 739; see Att'y Gen. of Isr v. Eichmann,
reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 5 (Jm. 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. 1962) (Isr.).
59. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
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In many of the cases, the opinions interweave multiple lines of reasoning that
reinforce and complement each other.6° The rest of this Part constructs a
taxonomy of these analytical claims. The next Part discusses their legitimacy
vis-A-vis international human rights law addressed to the rights of defendants.
A. THE SHIFTING STATUS OF NULLUM CRIMEN SIN LEGE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW
A recurring argument in the face of the defense of NCSL is that the principle
of NCSL simply does not apply in ICL with the same force and effect as it does
in the domestic penal order. This approach arose initially in defenses of the
legality of the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings and their postwar progeny.6
Judge Cassese, himself an international law judge, has opined that in the
post-war period, "[tlhe strict legal prohibition of ex post facto law had not yet
found expression in international law.",62 Even now, fifty years later, one Trial
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) reasoned that "[i]t is not certain to what extent [the principle of legality
and its components] have been admitted as part of international legal practice,
separate and apart from the existence of the national legal system., 63 It is
argued that because the different states of the world approach the NCSL
principle somewhat differently, no consistent formulation of the principle has
emerged that would be applicable to international courts as a general principle
60. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, 8ainovi6 & Ojdanid, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanid's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, paras. 37-42 (May 21,
2003) (relying on the existence of a customary rule, an equivalent rule under national law, and the
inherently atrocious behavior of the accused to reject his NCSL defense).
61. Many of the post-WWlI occupation courts echoed this reasoning. In the Justice Case, for
example, the court noted:
The ex post facto rule cannot apply in the international field as it does under constitutional
mandate in the domestic field .... International law is not the product of statute for the simple
reason that there is yet no world authority empowered to enact statutes of universal applica-
tion. International law is the product of multipartite treaties, conventions, judicial decisions
and customs which have received international acceptance or acquiescence. It would be sheer
absurdity to suggest that the ex post facto rule, as known to constitutional states, could be
applied to a treaty, a custom, or a common law decision of an international tribunal, or to the
international acquiescence which follows the events. To have attempted to apply the ex post
facto principle to judicial decisions of common international law would have been to strangle
that law at birth.
Justice Case, supra note 15, at 974-75.
62. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 72 (2003); see also Hans Kelsen, Will the
Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?, 1 INT'L L.Q. 153, 164
(1947) ("[T]his rule [against ex post facto legislation] is not valid at all within international law, and is
valid within national law only with important exceptions.").
63. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Mucid, Deli6 & Landlo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 403 (Nov.
16, 1998). This reasoning was echoed in Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera & Rwa-
makuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defense's Preliminary Motions Challenging Jurisdic-
tion: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 43 (May 11, 2004) ("The Chamber holds that, given the specificity
of international criminal law, the principle of legality does not apply to international criminal law to the
same extent as it applies in certain national legal systems.").
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of law. This, in turn, permits international tribunals to temper the application of
NCSL in their proceedings, in contradistinction to domestic courts that may be
constrained by the dictates of their own particular constitutional or statutory
schemes.'
Courts have also reasoned that to the extent that it exists in ICL, NCSL does
not apply to full effect. This is due, in part, to the perceived "different methods
of criminalisation of conduct in national and international criminal justice
systems. 65 In its discussion on the construction of its Statute, the ICTY
elaborated:
Whereas the criminalisation process in a national criminal justice system
depends upon legislation which dictates the time when conduct is prohibited
and the content of such prohibition, the international criminal justice system
attains the same objective through treaties or conventions, or after a custom-
ary practice of the unilateral enforcement of a prohibition by States. It could
be postulated, therefore, that the principles of legality in international criminal
law are different from their related national legal systems with respect to their
application and standards.66
Whereas the legislature defines the crime and prescribes the corresponding
punishment in domestic law, in ICL, states and nongovernmental bodies draft
treaties that embody core international prohibitions. The crimes themselves are
rarely drafted in terms of the basic elements of criminal law, such as mens rea,
actus reus, attendant circumstances, and so forth.67 This is due, in part, to the
fact that much treaty drafting has been done by diplomats (rather than specialists
in comparative criminal law) lacking technical-drafting skills who are working in the
context of political, and often politicized, multilateral negotiations.
Moreover, many ICL treaty provisions merely sketch out the broad contours
of legal prohibitions, as it was not necessarily envisioned that such provisions
would be applied directly as rules of decision in criminal prosecutions. Instead,
it was largely expected that states would incorporate the treaties' general
prohibitions. into their domestic penal codes and then apply these, presumably
more precise, criminal definitions in domestic proceedings upon gaining cus-
tody of an accused. Even where states parties have codified treaty crimes, their
legislatures have at times simply incorporated ICL by reference,68 especially
64. See Alicia Gil Gil, The Flaws of the Scilingo Judgment, 3 J. INT'L CIUM. JUST. 1082, 1087 (2005)
(noting that international courts can do things that domestic courts cannot).
65. Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 403.
66. Id. paras. 404-05.
67. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, para. 133 (Dec. 5,
2003) (ascertaining the elements of the crime of terror against the civilian population, which is
prohibited-but not defined-by the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions).
68. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (1996) (providing for jurisdiction over "war crimes".as defined by
enumerated treaties); see also Jordan J. Paust, It's No Defense: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, International
Crime and the Gingerbread Man, 60 ALa. L. REv. 657, 672-78 (1997) (citing referential statutes).
20081
HeinOnline  -- 97 Geo. L.J. 135 2008-2009
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
prior to the establishment of the ICC, at which time many states updated their
penal codes. The establishment of the modem international criminal tribunals-
and the vitalization of the principle of universal jurisdiction-have, for the first
time, enabled the more direct applicability of all of these provisions in actual
prosecutions.
In addition, the terminology in many international treaties is open-textured,
such as with respect to provisions prescribing the war crimes of "willfully
causing great suffering," committing "inhumane and degrading treatment or
punishment," or causing the destruction of property "not justified by military
necessity." This is at times by design, as drafters indicated that it would be
impossible to envision every type of conduct that deserved censure.69 In other
circumstances, these pockets of vagueness reflect the concerted ambiguity that
results from difficult interstate negotiations in which states have been known to
jealously guard the prerogatives of state sovereignty. It is thus left to the courts
to add content to these provisions through reference to potentially divergent
state conduct and often empty or self-serving rhetoric. This is the case even
though domestic principles of statutory construction would often counsel against
courts filling deliberate omissions in legislation, 70 and canonical international
law principles of treaty construction would compel adoption of an interpretation
that is most deferential to state sovereignty.71 As a result of these factors in ICL
formation, modem criminal tribunals must interpret treaties and statutes-some
relatively ancient-that were drafted without the precision we now expect from
modem penal codes. Although the ICC Statute, with its Elements of Crimes,72
69. With respect to the Geneva Conventions, the Commentary notes that "[h]owever great the care
taken in drawing up a list of all the various -forms of infliction, it would never be possible to catch up
with the imagination of future torturers who wished to satisfy their bestial instincts; and the more
specific and complete a list tries to be, the more restrictive it becomes." 3 INT'L CoMm. OF RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 39 (J. Pictet ed.
1958); see also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 49 (1979) (noting that
"whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able
to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms
which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague .....
70. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Muci6, Delid & Landio, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 412 (Nov.
16, 1998) ("It has always been the practice of courts not to fill omissions in legislation when this can be
said to have been deliberate. It would seem, however, that where the omission was accidental, it is usual
to supply the missing words to give the legislation the meaning intended.").
71. See 1 OPPENHEiM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1278-79 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992) (discussing the canon of in dubio mitius, which dictates that where treaty terms are ambiguous,
an interpretation should be chosen that is least onerous to the party assuming the obligation or that
interferes least with state sovereignty).
72. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum: Finalized Draft Text
of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOO724/27/PDF/N0072427.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter
Elements of Crimes]. During the Rome Conference, several delegations, led by the United States,
insisted that further elaboration of crimes beyond the statutory definitions was necessary and that
formal Elements of Crimes should be incorporated directly or by reference into the Statute. The United
States argued for the following statutory language: "Definitional elements for these crimes, contained in
annex XXX [placeholder in original], shall be an integral part of this Statute, and shall be applied by
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better approximates this level of precision, key terms remain undefined even in
that treaty. The persistent systematic indeterminacy of areas of ICL invites more
active judicial interpretation of the scope of international crimes as judges add
necessary content to avoid situations of non liquet that would inevitably exoner-
ate a malefactor-an unsavory outcome where atrocities are at issue.73
Complicating efforts to create a holistic corpus of law is the fact that the
international system lacks. a standing world legislature that can fill interstices
and lacuna, modernize ancient prohibitions, or fix faulty formulations. In the
domestic arena, there is the expectation that the legislature will rectify problems
in the law if they are revealed through the exoneration of individuals who have
committed bad acts. The only way treaties can be amended is through the
sporadic and sluggish multilateral treaty drafting process. Indeed, states are
loath to renegotiate existing treaties, not only because of the transaction costs
inherent to such an endeavor, but also because of the confusion wrought in
trying to keep track of which states have ratified which version of which treaty.
As Professor Eskridge has observed with respect to domestic statutes, it is most
appropriate for courts to adapt old norms with little chance of legislative
the Court in conjunction with the general provisions of criminal law, in its determination." Rome
Conference, June 15-17, 1998, Conference Document, A/CONF.183/C.1/L.8 (June 19, 1998). Other
delegations resisted, arguing that "the current definition of crimes in the Draft Statute generally meets
the requirements of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. There is no need at this stage for any
further elaboration on the material and mental elements of the crimes." Definition of Crimes, ICJ Brief
No. 1, to UN Diplomatic Conference (June 1988). Adopted as a compromise measure and part of a
"package deal" in the waning days of the Rome Conference, Article 9 reads, "Elements of Crimes shall
assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8. They shall be adopted by a
two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties." Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court art. 9, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC
Statute]. But see id. at art. 21 (placing Elements of Crime in the first tier of sources of law). Articles 9
and 21 can be reconciled by reading them in tandem: the Court "shall apply" the Elements for the
purpose of "assist[ing] the Court .... See Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, Article 21: Applicable
Law, in Comm.NTARv ON THE RoME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CmuNAL COURT 701, 705 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) (forthcoming) (draft, on file with author).
73. There is no express void for vagueness doctrine in international law that would allow an
international tribunal to strike part of its subject matter jurisdiction for vagueness. See Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that the void for vagueness doctrine bars the enforce-
ment of "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application .... ). But
see Prosecutor v. Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, para. 724 (July 31, 2003) (striking "other
inhumane acts" count for vagueness). One commentator has surmised that this absence is a feature of
the disempowerment of international judges:
The absence of any remedy for vagueness is presumably the result of both the general trend
toward limiting rather than expanding the power of the judges vis-Li-vis States Parties, and the
feeling that States Parties as legislators could be trusted to delineate clearly the crimes which
might ultimately be charged against their own agents.
Bruce Broomhall, Article 22: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, in CoMMENARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CwmmAL COURT 447, 452-53 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). Ironically, the ICL cases
presented herein suggest that, by contrast, international judges feel quite empowered to prescribe
conduct in the face of ambiguities in the law.
2008] ' 137
HeinOnline  -- 97 Geo. L.J. 137 2008-2009
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
revision. 4
Most importantly, perfect positivism is impossible where customary interna-
tional law (CIL)-the practice of states bolstered by a sense of legal duty-
remains an integral source of ICL. The CIL of international criminal law must
often be gleaned from various forms of state practice, including the ratification
of ICL treaties, the domestication of treaty norms, and the implementation and
enforcement of those norms through prosecutions before domestic courts. A
customary legal system does not lend itself to a robust NCSL principle.
Given this intermittent, decentralized, and curtailed process of law formation,
tribunals adjudicating ICL have lower expectations about the definitional preci-
sion of international crimes,7" reasoning that ICL cannot be expected to adhere
to the standards of specificity demanded from national criminal law. This is
particularly apparent in a line of cases raising the NCSL defense in the face of
vaguely worded international crimes. In the Oelebii case before the ICTY,
defendants moved for the dismissal of the counts that alleged the commission of
"wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health," "inhuman
treatment," and "cruel treatment." Defendants argued that dismissal was war-
ranted because these provisions contravened the principle of specificity and thus
could not serve as the basis of a criminal prosecution.76 In rejecting the defense
and convicting the defendants, an ICTY Trial Chamber added content to its
Statute by relying on the Geneva Convention Commentaries, the discussions
within human rights institutions concerning analogous provisions in human
rights treaties addressed to states parties and giving rise to state responsibility in
their breach, and the overarching principles animating international humanitar-
ian law (IHL). The Tribunal noted that these IHL prohibitions were deliberately
open-textured in order to reach a variety of conditions and conduct.7 7
The ICTY employed similar reasoning with respect to the residual category
of crimes against humanity in Article 5(i)-other inhumane acts.78 In the
KuprekiW case, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that it could be argued that the
74. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479,
1554-55 (1987); see also Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International
Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2006) (applying Eskridge's theory to
international humanitarian law).
75. Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, 8ainovid & Ojdanid, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub
Ojdani6's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, paras. 37-38 (May 21, 2003)
(setting forth the requirements of NCSL, but noting that courts must "tak[e] into account the specificity
of international law" in considering the principle's application).
76. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Mucid, Delid & Landlo, Case No. IT-96-21-T Judgment, paras. 503, 515
(Nov. 16, 1998).
77. Id. para. 532.
78. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art.
5(i), Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 23, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. During the drafting of
the ICC Statute, some delegates raised concern about the inclusion of this crime on the ground that it
"would not provide the clarity and precision required by the principle of legality, would not provide the
necessary certainty concerning crimes that would be subject to international prosecution and adjudica-
tion, would not sufficiently guarantee the rights of the accused and would place an onerous burden on
the Court to develop the law." Erkin Gadirov, Article 9: Elements of Crimes, in CoMMENTARY oN THE
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term "lacks precision and is too general to provide a safe yardstick for the work
of the Tribunal and, hence, that it is contrary to the principle of the 'specificity'
of criminal law.",79 Yet, the Tribunal determined that the term was "deliberately
designed as a residual category, as it was felt undesirable for this category to be
exhaustively enumerated. An exhaustive categorization would merely create
opportunities for evasion of the letter of the prohibition."8 ° The Trial Chamber
suggested that tribunals should look to international human rights law to
"identify a set of basic rights appertaining to human beings, the infringement of
which may amount, depending on the accompanying circumstances, to a crime
against humanity.""
In the Staki6 case, another Trial Chamber disagreed with the Kupregki6
residual approach and dismissed charges under Article 5(i) based upon allega-
tions of the forcible domestic transfer of persons. The Trial Chamber reasoned
that "the crime of 'other inhumane acts' subsumes a potentially broad range of
criminal behaviour and may well be considered to lack sufficient clarity,
precision and definiteness[. This] might violate the fundamental criminal law
principle nullum crimen sine lege certa.82 On appeal, neither party raised the
legality of "other inhumane acts." Nonetheless, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
addressed it proprio motu. The Appeals Chamber ruled that the crime against
humanity of "other inhumane acts" did not violate NCSL, as it formed part of
customary international law and served as a residual category for unenumerated
crimes.8 3
A notable exception to this trend in decision with respect to open-textured
RoME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 289, 294 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
79. Prosecutor v. Kupregkid, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, para. 563 (Jan. 14, 2000); see also
Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No IT-02-60-T, Judgment, para. 625 (Jan. 17, 2005) (noting that "the
principle of legality requires that a trier of fact exercise great caution in finding that an alleged act, not
regulated elsewhere in Article 5 of the Statute, forms part of this crime [of "other inhumane acts"]:
norms of criminal law must always provide individuals with sufficient notice of what is criminal
behaviour and what is not").
80. Kupreikil, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, para. 563.
81. Id. para. 566.
82. Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, para. 719 (July 31, 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Trial Chamber went on to rule that the crime against humanity of
deportation covered the alleged inhumane acts, which involved the forced movement of persons across
a de facto, as opposed to a strictly international, boundary. Id. para. 723. This ruling was novel in its
own right, as deportation historically referred to the forcible transfer of a person across an international
border. The drafters of the ICC Statute dropped this distinction; Article 7(1)(d) prohibits "deportation or
forcible transfer," and the Elements of Crimes makes no mention of the necessity of traversing such a
boundary. Elements of Crimes, supra note 72.
83. Prosecutor v. Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, paras. 314-15 (Mar. 22, 2006). The
Appeals Chamber did, however, scale back the Trial Chamber's ruling that deportation (as a crime
against humanity) could also be charged for moving individuals across shifting frontlines-as opposed
to de facto or de jure state boundaries-as contrary to the NCSL principle. Id. paras. 300-03. At the
same time, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's determination that "other inhumane
acts" did not encompass the internal-as opposed to international-forcible transfer of persons. Id.
para. 317.
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provisions appears in the case against Vasiljevi6. There, Trial Chamber II of the
ICTY acquitted the defendant of the count alleging his commission of "violence
to life and person" as set forth in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
The Tribunal reasoned that the offense was not defined with sufficient specific-
ity under international law to serve as the basis for a criminal prosecution.84
This assessment, the Tribunal stressed, must take into account "the specificity of
international law, in particular that of customary international law.",8 5 It would
be impermissible, it noted, for a criminal conviction to be based on "a norm
which an accused could not reasonably have been aware of at the time of the
acts, and this norm must make it sufficiently clear what act or omission could
engage his criminal responsibility., 86 In so ruling, the Trial Chamber rejected
the reasoning of a different Trial Chamber that had convicted a defendant of the
crime, noting that the offense was defined by the "cumulation" of elements of
other listed offenses, such as murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.87
Related to this consideration of the lesser application of the principle of
NCSL to ICL is the characterization of NCSL within ICL as a flexible principle
of justice or a policy choice that can yield to competing imperatives rather than
as a rigid rule that applies in all circumstances.88 Under this approach, tribunals
recognize that convicting a defendant in breach of the principle of NCSL is one
form of injustice. Allowing inadvertent or even deliberate "loopholes" in the
law to exonerate a malefactor results in an injustice of an altogether different,
perhaps more profound, kind. By subordinating the principle of NCSL to a
vision of substantive justice, tribunals have determined that the former injustice
is less problematic than the latter.89 Thus, in explaining the outcome at Nurem-
berg, Judge Cassese has noted that, at the time, "the nullum crimen sine lege
principle could be regarded as a moral maxim destined to yield to superior
exigencies whenever it would have been contrary to justice not to hold persons
84. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, para. 201 (Nov. 29, 2002) ("Once it is
.satisfied that a certain act or set of acts is indeed criminal under customary international law, the Trial
Chamber must satisfy itself that this offence with which the accused is charged was defined with
sufficient clarity under customary international law for its general nature, its criminal character and its
approximate gravity to have been sufficiently foreseeable and accessible.").
85. Id.
86. Id. para. 193.
87. See Prosecutor v. Blalkid, Case No. 95-14-T, Judgment, para. 182 (Mar. 3, 2000).
88. See Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, 8ainovi6 & Ojdanid, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanid's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 37 (May 21,
2003).
89. See Kelsen, supra note 62, at 165 ("In case two postulates of justice are in conflict with each
other, the higher one prevails; and to punish those who were morally responsible for the international
crime of the second World War may certainly be considered as more important than to comply with the
rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, open to so many exceptions."). Kelsen also argued that
Nazi defendants should not benefit from the protections of the principle of legality when they denied
them to so many of their subjects. See Hans Kelsen, The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Laws and the
Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals, 11 JUDmE ADvoc. J. 8, 46 (1945); see also CAsSEsE, supra note
62, at 139 (discussing the substantive justice approach).
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accountable for appalling atrocities." 90 Thus, courts will balance considerations
of "the preservation of justice and fairness towards the accused" against the
articulated needs of the international community for security, accountability,
and "the preservation of world order."9 In so doing, courts construct, or
acknowledge, a hierarchy of principles that elevates the latter set of concerns.
Most important in this line of reasoning is the belief that building a robust
system of international justice will generate a more reliable deterrent effect,
contribute to the prevention of abuses in the future, and ensure a more secure
public order for all.
The principle's frequent invocation by modem international criminal tribu-
nals thus suggests that the extreme version of the argument that NCSL does not
apply in ICL is overstated. These tribunals accept the applicability of the
principle to proceedings before them;9 2 however, they have rejected, or im-
pliedly denied, the absolute positivistic version of the principle in favor of the
general applicability of the values underlying the principle. Most international
courts treat NCSL as an applicable general principle of law that must be adapted
to the international law context of the cases before them. Indeed, the tribunals
occasionally articulate the notion that international jurisdiction is special, and
that the application of NCSL is different in international courts than it is in
domestic courts.9 3
B. THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
When considering how to prioritize potentially competing principles, the ICL
tribunals will invoke the object and purpose of ICL as an interpretive tool. In
Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi, for example, defendants invoked the NCSL
defense in an effort to thwart prosecutions based on contested forms of responsi-
bility.94 In a preliminary challenge to jurisdiction, defendants argued that IHL
90. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 72.
91. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Muci6, Deli6 & Landlo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 405 (Nov.
16, 1998).
92. See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera & Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T,
Decision on Defense's Preliminary Motions Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para.
39 (May 11, 2004) ("The Chamber agrees with the Defence that, in deciding on the present issue, the
Chamber is bound to respect the principle nullum crimen sine lege.").
93. This notion of international judicial privilege is apparent elsewhere in ICL, for example in the
jurisprudence on the applicability of amnesty laws and immunity doctrines before international courts.
See Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, para. 155 (Dec. 10, 1998) (noting that
international crimes can be prosecuted before an international tribunal notwithstanding a domestic
amnesty law that might block a domestic proceeding); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-
AR72(E), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, paras. 51-52 (May 31, 2004) (finding that the
international court was not bound by the head of state immunity doctrine applicable within domestic
courts).
94. Prosecutor v. Hadlihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction, para. 36 (Nov. 12, 2002). In this regard, see also the Tadi6 case, which
established that the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise was a form of complicity prosecutable in light
of the Tribunal's object and purpose. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, paras. 190-91
(July 15, 1999).
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did not allow superiors to be prosecuted for the acts of their subordinates in
non-international armed conflicts, primarily because Protocol I, applicable in
international conflicts, is the first and only IHL treaty to set out the elements of
the superior responsibility doctrine.95 The Trial Chamber dismissed the appeal.
In clarifying the meaning of the NCSL prohibition, the Trial Chamber invoked
the distinction between conduct and classification. It determined that NCSL
required the prior illegality of the conduct in question, but was agnostic as to
how that conduct was classified under any applicable body of law. As long as it
was foreseeable and accessible to a possible perpetrator that his conduct was
punishable at the time of commission, the principle of NCSL was satisfied.96
Thus, "[tihe emphasis on conduct, rather than on the specific description of the
offence in substantive criminal law, is of primary relevance. ' ,97 The nature of
the resulting penalty too was irrelevant from the perspective of the Trial
Chamber: "whether the conduct may lead to criminal responsibility, disciplinary
responsibility or other sanctions is not of material importance" as long as the
defendant knew the conduct was condemned.98
The Trial Chamber adopted an expansive teleological approach in reaching
this result that took into account the Security Council's object and purpose in
creating the ICTY, which it identified as the assurance of accountability for
violations of international law committed on the territory of the former Yugosla-
via, regardless of how that conflict was characterized. 99 It noted that the Council
cited statements made by states during the drafting of the ICTY Statute evincing
an expectation that the doctrine of superior responsibility would be enforced by
the Tribunal without reference to the nature of the conflict, although this survey
revealed that no state specifically argued for, or acknowledged, the applicability
of the doctrine in non-international armed conflicts. 1i° The Trial Chamber then
went further to examine the object and purpose of IHL writ large:'O° the
"regulat[ion of] the means and methods of warfare[, the protection of] persons
not actively participating in armed conflict from harm" and the "respect for
95. See Hadlihasanovi6, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Interlocutory Appeal on Decision on Joint Chal-
lenge to Jurisdiction (Nov. 12, 2002) (consolidating the defendants' arguments on the legality of the
superior responsibility counts for interlocutory appeal).
96. Had;ihasanovi6, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, para. 62. In
this regard, the Trial Chamber cited Article 22 of the ICC Statute, which states that "A person shall not
be criminally responsible ... unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court." Id. (emphasis added by Trial Chamber). The Trial Chamber
also noted that the extradition law principle of double criminality is also satisfied where the conduct in
question is criminal in both the sending and receiving state. Id.
97. Id. paras. 62, 165.
98. Id. para. 62.
99. Id. paras. 97-101, 112, 115-19, 172-73.
100. Id. paras. 105-09 (highlighting the responses of Italy, the United States, Canada, and the
Netherlands).
101. Id. paras. 164-65 ("The International Tribunal is in a different position than States and can
apply all principles of international criminal law to achieve the purposes of international humanitarian
law.").
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human dignity." 10 2 The Trial Chamber invoked the Preamble of the Second
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions,1 0 3 which contains a variant of
the Martens Clause, °4 as inspiration to consider the fundamental principles
underlying IHL.105 The Chamber noted that the doctrine of superior responsibil-
ity promotes two such principles: the existence of individual criminal responsi-
bility for violations, even where treaties are silent on penal enforcement, and the
principle of responsible command. The doctrine of superior responsibility pro-
motes compliance with IHL by addressing those best able to ensure that
subordinates in the field observe IHL rules through mandating training, dissemi-
nating rules and expectations of behavior, monitoring conduct, signaling the
unacceptability of infringing conduct, investigating violations, and punishing
violators. 106
In an interlocutory appeal, defendants argued that the Trial Chamber had
misstated and misapplied the principle of legality in several respects. First,
defendants argued, the Chamber failed to comprehend that applying the dictates
of NCSL to the context of superior responsibility required a showing that the
superior would have known that his or her own conduct in failing to control his
subordinates might be punishable, not just that the predicate conduct of the
subordinates was criminal. 107 Second, defendants argued that the Trial Chamber
failed to comprehend that the conduct of the superior must have been punish-
able under the law applicable to non-international armed conflict rather than that
applicable to international armed conflict. 10 8 Third, defendants argued that the
102. Id. para. 64; see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, para. 146
(Mar. 24, 2000) (noting that the object of the Geneva Conventions is to ensure the "protection of
civilians to the maximum extent possible").
103. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts pmbl., June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol II]. Protocol II develops the law governing non-international armed conflicts.
.104. The Martens Clause, which finds expression in a number of IHL treaties, states that "[u]ntil a
more complete code of the laws of war is issued... populations and belligerents remain under the
protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established
between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience."
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 21, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No.
403. In most IHL treaties, some version of the Clause appears in the preamble. The First Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions elevates it to a substantive provision. See Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts art. 1(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N:T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1] ("In the cases not
covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under
the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.").
105. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction, para. 160 (Nov. 12, 2002).
106. Id. para. 16.
107. Hadtihasanovi6 Appellate Brief, supra note 95, para. 20.
108. Id. ("Whether conduct is punishable must be seen in the context of this fundamental distinction
between the two bodies of law. The fact that the conduct may be prohibited by the law applicable in
international conflict does not ipso facto make the same conduct unlawful in internal conflict
.... Given the historical distinction between the bodies of law applicable to each kind of conflict, it
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Trial Chamber overstated the level of sanction necessary to put defendants on
notice. The defendants contended that the applicable law must provide for
individual criminal liability, rather than simply "other sanctions," which could
include civil negligence claims. 109 Finally, defendants claimed that the principle
of responsible command does not necessarily give rise to the penal doctrine of
superior responsibility. Rather, "the notion of responsible command referred to
in [Protocol II] serves as a jurisdictional prerequisite for the applicability of the
Protocol, namely that it will only apply to armed forces in internal conflict who
are subject to responsible command, and not disorganised groups who are not
commanded."'"°
The defense also critiqued the Trial Chamber for its reliance on the object and
purpose of IHL:
The lack of a clear basis in international law for the present prosecution
cannot be side-stepped by drawing upon the object and purpose of IHL, in
general, and the Statute of the ICTY .... The protection of humanity and
preservation of world order as the overriding aims of IHL cannot serve as a
basis to criminalise behaviour beyond the" existing law. There would be no
limits on the scope of IHL if the only guiding criterion was whether the
prosecution was broadly in the interests of the spirit of IHL. Where the rights
of the accused in a criminal trial are concerned, utmost respect for legality, for
certainty and foreseeability of the law is required.'11
In total, the defendants charged that "[t]he effect of the Trial Chamber's
definition would be to permit ex post facto extension of existing offences to
cover facts that previously did not attract criminal liability whenever it is





In affirming, the Appeals Chamber ruled that the doctrine of superior responsi-
bility is the most effective means of enforcing the foundational principle of
responsible command, which applies to the laws of war governing all forms of
armed conflict." 3 Because CIL "recognizes that some war crimes can be
committed by a member of an organised military force in the course of an
internal armed conflict[,] it therefore also recognizes that there can be command
cannot be said that it is foreseeable that conduct is unlawful in internal conflict on the basis that it is
prohibited in international conflict.").
109. Id.
110. Id. para. 81.
111. Id. para. 25.
112. Id.
113. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, paras. 16-17, 22
(July 16, 2003) ("[T]he concept of responsible command looks to the duties comprised in the idea of
command, whereas that of command responsibility looks at liability flowing from breach of those
duties. But ... the elements of command responsibility are derived from the elements of responsible
command.").
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responsibility in respect of such crimes." 114 In considering the differential
treatment of superior responsibility in Protocol I and II, the Appeals Chamber
noted that "the non-reference in Protocol H to command responsibility in
relation to internal armed conflicts did not necessarily affect the question
whether command responsibility previously existed as part of customary interna-
tional law relating to internal armed conflicts."'1 5 In this analysis, the ICTY
largely overlooked obvious reasons why states may have chosen not to apply
the doctrine to non-international armed conflicts when they were drafting
Protocol II. Besides the fact that states have historically been more reluctant to
develop binding rules addressing internal conflicts, they may have considered
the doctrine inapplicable in such conflicts where armed forces may be disorga-
nized and spontaneous, and lines of authority may be self-proclaimed, de facto,
and decentralized.11 6 Indeed, the principle of unity of command-which states
that there is only one commander at any given level of the military hierarchy
with command authority over subordinates-may be undercut or entirely absent
in the context of a. non-international armed conflict.' 7 Finally, the Appeals
Chamber confirmed that the applicability of the superior responsibility doctrine
in non-international armed conflicts was both foreseeable and accessible to
defendants embattled in the former Yugoslavia:
As to foreseeability, the conduct in question is the concrete conduct of the
accused; he must be able to appreciate that the conduct is criminal in the sense
generally understood, without reference to any specific provision. As to
accessibility, in the case of an international tribunal such as this, accessibility
does not exclude reliance being placed on a law which is based on custom.l"
8
The precise framing of the overarching object and purpose of ICL has
contributed to the tribunals' more relaxed approach to the dictates of the strict
version of NCSL. A fundamental assumption underpinning the principle of
legality is that it will deter crime by ensuring fair notice of proscribed con-
duct.1 19 This assumes known, or knowable, law and rational actors who will
structure their conduct to avoid anticipated censure. To date, the deterrence of
114. Id. para. 18.
115. Id. para. 29.
116. See Prosecutor v. Delalid, Mucid, Delid & Landio, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 193
(Feb. 20, 2001) (noting the difficulty of determining command hierarchies in contemporary conflicts).
117. See id.
118. Hadfihasanovid, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, para. 34. Judge Hunt, in his separate opinion,
likened the majority's reasoning to the common law approach taken in the post-WWII period to adapt
established principles to novel situations. Hadtihasanovi, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Separate and
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt: Command Responsibility Appeal, para. 4 (July 16,
2003).
119. Jacquins v. Commonwealth, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 279, 281 (1852) ("The reason why [ex post
facto] laws are so universally condemned, is that they overlook the great object of all criminal law,
which is, to hold up the fear and certainty of punishment as a counteracting motive, to the minds of
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individuals within their personal jurisdiction has not been a primary motivation
of existing ICL tribunals. Many modem ICL tribunals-such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the East Timor Special Panels, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)-were established (or have asserted jurisdiction)
after the horrific events in question; the ICTY (for the latter part of its existence)
and ICC are exceptions. Being ex post, these tribunals were unable to exert any
meaningful deterrent effect on defendants within their personal jurisdiction and
had to settle for contributing to the deterrence of future perpetrators. Even
scholars devoted to the field doubt whether ICL can yet exert a meaningful
deterrent effect 120 under contemporary circumstances where international jus-
tice remains sporadic and random. 121 Until legal censure is more certain, the
narratives that explain why seemingly ordinary people do evil things in the
context of war or state-sponsored repression-because they are beset by preju-
dices, intoxicated by power, manipulated by elites, terrified into submission by
superior orders or threats of retaliation for their inaction, or caught up in a
maelstrom of violence-likely still overwhelm any cost-benefit analysis in
which individual perpetrators may engage.
While any cumulative deterrent effect in ICL remains feeble, other goals of
criminal justice-retribution; the incapacitation of perpetrators; the compensa-
tion, satisfaction, and rehabilitation of victims; and the public condemnation of
injurious behavior-become more salient. 122 These other goals still can be
advanced where the strict dictates of NCSL are de-emphasized. Retribution and
condemnation 123 in particular focus on the individual culpability of the defen-
dant and his bad acts, as well as the harm suffered by victims. Although one
may decry retribution as a primitive and unenlightened motivation for criminal
law, its enduring potency cannot be denied. Anti-impunity (perhaps a kinder,
persons tempted to crime to prevent them from-committing it. But a punishment prescribed after an act
is done, cannot, of course, present any such motive.").
120. See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23
FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 476, 483 (1999) ("Even if we assume that those committing atrocities engage
in rational cost-benefit calculations (weighing the risk of prosecution against the personal and political
gain of continued participation in ethnic cleansing and similar acts), most probably view the risk of
prosecution as slight .... Even if successful, the contribution of such mass prosecutions to deterrence
is uncertain at best."). But see Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 7, 12 (2001) ("Where leaders engage in some form of
rational cost-benefit calculation, the threat of punishment can increase the costs of a policy that is
criminal under international law.").
121. See Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 LNT'L CRiM. L. REV.
93, 116 (2002) (noting the "selectivity" of international prosecutions).
122. See Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understand-
ing Transitional Justice, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 39, 44-47 (2002) (discussing the multiple goals of
criminal law).
123. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, para. 65 (Nov. 29,
1996) ("[T]he International Tribunal sees public reprobation and stigmatisation by the international
community, which would thereby express its indignation over heinous crimes and denounce the
perpetrators, as one of the essential functions of a prison sentence for a crime against humanity.").
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gentler term for retribution) is often cited as a key object and purpose of ICL.'24
In the face of centuries, if not millennia, of impunity for what we now consider
human rights atrocities, retributive impulses may exceed concerns for the strict
adherence to the legality principle, as courts are unwilling to let bad behavior
continue to go unpunished.125 Although the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings
have been critiqued as one-sided victors' justice, in general, there is little
tradition in ICL of over-reaching or arbitrary prosecutions. Instead, the problem
historically has been the chronic under-enforcement of ICL. As a result, there is
still little concern for "over-deterrence." Instead, there is a willingness to
overlook legalisms that would lead to impunity in an effort to jumpstart a
system of greater accountability.
The ICTY's teleological approach is doctrinally legitimate with respect to
treaty interpretation, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
126
provides that a "treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose."' 127 This teleological approach is also well
established within the jurisprudence of the various human rights institutions,
which quite self-consciously interpret their constitutive treaties as "living"
instruments that must adapt to modern needs in order to advance fundamental
human rights and sustain a protective public order applicable to all those within
124. ICC Statute, supra note 72, at.pmbl. (affirming that "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished").
125. This emphasis on accountability reflects the polar shift that often occurs among human rights
advocates who espouse the rights of defendants in domestic criminal proceedings, but cheer for the
prosecution in international ones. In both cases, advocates have aligned themselves against the source
of superior power-the state in the domestic context, and the impunity-enjoying perpetrator in the
international context.
126. This analysis assumes the applicability of the Vienna Convention approach to the statutes of the
ad hoc tribunals, not all of which are technically treaties. Notwithstanding the different instruments
creating these tribunals, the provisions governing the subject matter jurisdiction of all of the tribunals
are drawn directly from ICL treaties. This provenance may indirectly justify a treaty-based approach to
interpretation. In addition, the Vienna Convention regime mirrors the techniques governing the interpre-
tation of domestic legal instruments, such as contracts, which arguably renders the Vienna Convention's
interpretive rules applicable as "general principles of law." William A. Schabas, Interpreting the
Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, in MAN's IauNrry To MAN 847, 852 (Lal Chand Vohrah et al. eds.,
2003) (arguing that defendants are entitled to strict construction). In any case, the ad hoc tribunals
regularly cite the Vienna Convention for guidance in interpreting their statutes. See, e.g., Kanyabashi v.
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-15-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on the
Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
para. 15 (June 3, 1999); Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, para. 18 (Aug. 10, 1995) ("Although the
Statute of the International Tribunal is a sui generis legal instrument and not a treaty, in interpreting its
provisions and the drafters' conception of the applicability of the jurisprudence of other courts, the rules
of treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties appear relevant.").
127. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), Jan. 27, 1989, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention, while not universally subscribed to, is
generally considered to have codified the customary international law of treaties and is treated as
definitive by international and domestic tribunals. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 1 214
(June 30).
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 97 Geo. L.J. 147 2008-2009
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
signatory states. 128 By joining such a multilateral human rights regime, states
parties submit themselves to a particular legal order and assume the obligations
set forth in these treaties for the benefit of individuals within their espace
juridique and not for the benefit of themselves or other contracting states.' 29
At least in the realm of IHL, a teleological approach is also permitted, if not
mandated, by the Martens Clause. 130 The Clause suggests a reservoir of uncodi-
fled law applicable in armed conflict in the absence of complete codification.' 3 t
It allows, indeed mandates, courts to go beyond the written text 132 and invoke
not only customary international law ("the usages established between civilized
nations") but also the moral bases of humanitarian obligations-that is, "pre-
juridical principles [and] the sentiments of humanity.,1 33 As such, the Martens
Clause also provides a principle of interpretation. If "faced with two interpreta-
128. See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human
Rights (arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Sept. 24, 1982, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. A) No. 2
para. 27 (1982), reprinted in 67 I.L.R 568 (1984) ("[T]he object and purpose of the Convention is not
the exchange of reciprocal rights between a limited number of States, but the protection of the human
rights of all individual human beings within the Americas, irrespective of their nationality."); see also
Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980), reprinted in 58 I.L.R 188,
291 ("Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the [European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral
undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the Preamble, benefit from a 'collective
enforcement."').
129. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the
Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 EtR. J. INT'L L. 529, 532 (2003).
130. Justice Jackson referenced the Martens Clause in connection with the proposed crimes against
humanity charge in his letter to President Truman on the status of what would become the Nuremberg
trials. See Jackson Report, supra note 35. Tribunals in the post-WWII period also applied the Martens
Clause to confirm the illegality of certain conduct absent positive law criminalization. In the Justice
Case, for example, the Clause was invoked for the proposition that the deportation of the inhabitants of
occupied territory constituted a war crime under CIL. Transcript of Prosecution's Opening Statement,
United States v. Alstotter (Justice Case), reprinted in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALs BEFORE THE NuERNBERO
TIBMUNAL UNDER CONTROL CouNcu. LAW No. 10, at 31, 66 (1951).
131. The full meaning and import of the Martens Clause remains in dispute. Some states argue that it
simply reminds states parties that they are bound by CIL alongside their treaty obligations. Others
consider it defunct given the state of codification of the law of armed conflict. Still others argue that the
Clause goes further as a source of norms regulating state conduct in the absence of a treaty of CIL rule.
These views came to a head in the ICJ's Nuclear Weapons opinion. See Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 405-09 (July 8) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
See generally Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (2000).
132. Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional
Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377, 390 (2006) ("[T]he
Martens Clause... codifies a legal view that necessitates a high level of deference to judges to engage
in progressive development as they define reasonable standards in the diverse international commu-
nity.").
133. The Attitude of States Toward the Development of Humanitarian Law, in THE NEW HuMANrrAR-
IAN LAW OF ARmED CONFLICT: PROCEEDINGS OF TIM 1976 AND 1977 CONFERENCES 221, 257 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1980) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (emphasis omitted). This "language was revolutionary in
its recognition that the codified laws of war were incomplete and could supplement and interact with
customary laws of war." Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During the
Persian Gulf War: An Overview, 37 A.F L. REv. 41, 45 (1994).
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tions--one in keeping with the principles of humanity and moral standards, and
one which is against these principles-then we should of course give priority to
the former interpretation."
134
Arguably, any right to strict construction implied by the NCSL principle
might override the broad interpretive approach sanctioned by the Vienna Conven-
tions and subsequent ICL practice as a lex specialis. The Vienna Convention
provides a generic, "off the rack" approach to treaty interpretation that does not
contain special consideration for penal treaties. 135 Even the Martens Clause was
drafted at a time when individual criminal responsibility-with its attendant
concerns with the principle of legality-was not yet established as an expected
response to treaty breaches. Referring to extratextual principles is more palat-
able with respect to holding states responsible for breaches than it is for
criminally prosecuting individuals where penal sanctions are at issue. Nonethe-
less, these cases demonstrate that the Vienna Convention regime, coupled with
the Martens Clause, has provided a methodology for tribunals to invoke the
object and purpose of ICL to resolve ambiguities in, or to extend, positive
law. 136
C. ILLEGALITY = CRIMINALITY
NCSL defenses have been frequently asserted in situations in which there is a
norm governing state behavior that does not, on its face, govern individual
behavior or render such behavior strictly criminal. Many historical ICL and IHL
treaties are silent as to individual criminal responsibility precisely because they
were drafted at a time when the international community only conceived of
collective (state) responsibility for breaches. This meant that injured states
could resort to reprisals 37 or seek reparations from responsible states' 38 in the
event of a breach. Nonetheless, starting with the Nuremberg Tribunal's reason-
134. PROCEiINGS, supra note 133, at 257. In this way, the Martens Clause:
is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, making the usages established
among civilized nations, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience into the
legal yardstick to be applied if and when the specific provisions of the [Hague] Convention
and the Regulations annexed to it do not cover specific cases occurring in warfare, or
concomitant to warfare.
United States v. Krupp, reprinted in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRnAImLs BEFORE Ta NuERNBERG MILTARY
TtaRuNALs UNDER CONTROL CouNcrL No. 10, at 1327, 1341 (1950).
135. See Schabas, supra note 126, at 852-55 (arguing that defendants are entitled to strict construc-
tion).
136. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, para. 19 (Oct. 7, 1997) (holding
thai notwithstanding the lack of a customary international law rule or a general principle of law, duress
does not constitute a complete defense to the killing of innocents by a soldier).
137. See Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, Case No. IT-96-16-T, Judgment, para. 530 (Jan. 14, 2000)
(discussing historical practice of reprisals).
138. See, e.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 2 [hereinafter Fourth Hague Convention] ("A belligerent party which
violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.
It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces."). Nicaragua
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ing with respect to the crimes against the peace charge, modem tribunals quite
easily equate the historical international condemnation of a practice with its
criminalization. 139 As a result, treaties that were originally devoted to the
regulation of state conduct have been effectively recast as treaties penalizing
individual conduct.
This equation of illegality with criminality is especially apparent in the war
crimes jurisprudence, given that many IHL treaties do not contain penal provi-
sions. Indeed, by design, none of the treaties or treaty provisions addressing
civil wars and other non-international armed conflicts sets forth a penal regime
or a schedule of war crimes along the lines of the grave breaches provisions in
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which govern international armed conflicts. And
yet, the modem tribunals have made quick work of dismantling distinctions
between the norms applicable in international and non-international armed
conflicts that were so carefully crafted by states during the IHL treaty-drafting
process. As a result, much of the conduct prohibited or criminalized by treaties
governing international armed conflicts now constitutes actionable war crimes
even if committed in non-international armed conflicts.
The inaugural example of this reasoning is found in the proceedings involv-
ing the first defendant to be prosecuted before a modern international tribunal.
In the preliminary proceedings contesting the legality of the charges against
him, Dusko Tadi6 argued that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was an
internal-rather than an international-war. He contended that neither the 1949
Geneva Conventions nor the Fourth Hague Convention regulated non-
international armed conflicts, with the exception of Common Article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions, which does not mention criminal responsibility. For
support, Tadi6 invoked the U.N. Secretary-General's admonition that the Tribu-
nal could apply only those rules of humanitarian law that were "beyond doubt"
part of customary law. 140 His argument was aimed at the dismissal of the
charges brought under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, which reproduces the list
of grave breaches recognized by the Geneva Conventions, and Article 3, which
reproduces text from the Fourth Hague Convention.
sought such reparations before the ICJ in connection with the United States' support of the Contras. See
generally Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
139. Prosecutor v. Delali, Muci6, Delid & Landlo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 162 (Feb.
20, 2001) ("a finding of individual criminal responsibility is not barred by the absence of treaty
provisions on punishment of breaches"). But see Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid, Case No. IT-98-32-T,
Judgment, paras. 196, 199 (Nov. 29, 2002) ("[U]nder no circumstances may the court create new
criminal offences after the act charged against an accused... by criminalising an act which had not
until the present time been regarded as criminal .... For criminal liability to attach, it is not
sufficient... merely to establish that the act in question was illegal under international law, in the sense
of being liable to engage the responsibility of a state which breaches that prohibition, nor is it enough to
establish that the act in question was a crime under the domestic law of the person who committed the
act." (emphasis in original)).
140. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, para. 34, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Secretary-General's Report].
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The Appeals Chamber ruled that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (allowing for
jurisdiction over the "laws or customs of war") applied to both international and
non-international armed conflicts.14 1 In so ruling, the Appeals Chamber looked
to the Security Council's object and purpose in promulgating the ICTY Statute,
which was to bring "to justice persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, thereby deterring
future violations and contributing to the re-establishment of peace and security
in the region."' 142 The Appeals Chamber noted that in Security Council delibera-
tions, delegates never characterized the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as
either international or non-international; rather, they focused on condemning
particular conduct of the belligerents. 143 The Appeals Chamber concluded that
to rule that both war crimes provisions (Articles 2 and 3) applied only in a time
of international armed conflict-thus authorizing "the International Tribunal to
prosecute and punish certain conduct in an international armed conflict, while
turning a blind eye to the very same conduct in an internal armed conflict ' 44 -
would discount the Security Council's apparent indifference to the nature of the
conflict and defeat the goal of punishing condemned acts committed therein.
145
The Appeals Chamber ruled that, while there had been no "full and mechani-
cal transplant" 14 6 of rules governing international armed conflict to the body of
law governing non-international armed conflict, Article 3 contemplated a corpus
of law applicable to non-international armed conflict that was geared toward
protecting civilians and those hors de combat ("out of the fight") and regulating
the means and methods of warfare. It then interpreted Article 3 to cover serious
infringements of IHL beyond those outlined in Article 2 of the Statute, such as:
(1) breaches of the 1907 Hague Conventions; (2) breaches of other provisions
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions not treated therein as grave breaches, includ-
ing violations of Common Article 3; (3) breaches of uncodified customary
humanitarian law; and (4) breaches of humanitarian law treaties in force
between the warring parties. 
147
To guide future inquiries, the Appeals Chamber identified four factors that
must be satisfied in order for an offense to be cognizable under the catch-all
141. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 77 (Oct. 2, 1995).
142. Id. para. 72.
143. Id. para. 74.
144. Id. para. 78.
145. The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber on the applicability of the Geneva Conven-
tions' grave breaches provisions to non-international armed conflicts. In a separate opinion, Judge
Abi-Saab argued that the Tribunal should have affirmed the Trial Chamber's Article 2 ruling in order to
rationalize the laws of war and rectify an "artificial" division of labor between the ICTY statutory
provisions that does not reflect the modern trend toward considering war crimes committed in internal
armed conflicts to be "grave breaches." Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Separate Opinion of Judge
Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, pt. IV (Oct. 2, 1995).
146. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, para. 126.
147. Id. para. 89.
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Article 3 in the context of a non-international armed conflict: (1) the act must
infringe a rule of IHL; (2) the rule must be customary in nature or, if contained
in a treaty, the treaty must be applicable; (3) the violation must be "serious,"
which is to say the rule must protect "important values" and "the breach must
involve grave consequences for the victim"; and (4) the violation must entail,
under customary or conventional law, individual criminal responsibility. 148 With
respect to the applicability of individual criminal responsibility, point (4) above,
the Appeals Chamber noted that the Nuremberg Tribunal had concluded that
individual criminal responsibility could exist in the absence of an explicit treaty
provision to that effect. 149 The Appeals Chamber surveyed state practice-in the
form of national prosecutions, military manuals, and legislation criminalizing
IHL violations in internal conflict-to conclude that while Common Article 3
and Protocol II are silent as to criminal enforcement, certain breaches of the law
of armed conflict committed in non-international armed conflicts nonetheless
constitute international crimes as a matter of customary international law.
Further to this example, in Prosecutor v. Karemera, defendants argued that
the ICTR lacked jurisdiction to prosecute persons for committing a crime
through the extended form of joint criminal enterprise liability during an
internal, as opposed to an international, armed conflict. 150 Citing an extension
of the four-part TadiW test to forms of responsibility, defendants argued that the
Tribunal could only prosecute individuals for a form of liability where (1) the
form was provided for in the Statute, explicitly or implicitly; (2) the form
existed under customary international law at the relevant time; (3) the law
providing for that form of liability was sufficiently accessible at the relevant
time; and (4) the defendant would have been able to foresee that he could be
held criminally liable for his actions if apprehended. 15' Defendants conceded
that prior precedent had established the existence of joint criminal enterprise
liability (JCE) in international armed conflicts, 15 2 but noted that all the sources
148. Id. para. 94.
149. In Akayesu, the ICTR followed the ICTY's lead and determined that parts of Additional
Protocol I (particularly Article 4(2)'s fundamental guarantees) entail individual criminal responsibility
as a matter of CIL. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-94-4-T, Judgment, paras. 615-17 (Dec. 6,
1999). This argument was bolstered by the observation that all the acts in question were crimes under
Rwandan law and that Rwanda had ratified the treaties. Id. para. 617.
150. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera & Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T,
Decision on Defense's Preliminary Motions Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise (May
11, 2004). In Hadiihasanovi6, the defendants made similar arguments with respect to the doctrine of
superior responsibility. The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the challenge. See Prosecutor v. Had~i-
hasanovi6, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in
Relation to Command Responsibility (July 16, 2003).
151. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defense's Preliminary Motions Challenging
Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 2; see also Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, ainovid & Ojdanid,
Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Ojdanid's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-
Perpetration, para. 15 (Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6 & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
Judgment, para. 695 n.2145 (Jan. 17, 2005).
152. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995). The ICTY's invocation of JCE liability in Tadie was an
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relied upon-primarily WWII caselaw-emerged in the wake of an interna-
tional armed conflict. Defendants also noted that neither Common Article 3 nor
Protocol II includes provisions relating to JCE liability.
153
The Trial Chamber ruled that JCE liability is well recognized as one of the
forms of criminal responsibility prosecutable under Article 6(1) of the ICTR
Statute and that this provision is equally applicable to all crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether committed in the course of international or
internal armed conflicts. 154 Noting that IHL imposes individual criminal respon-
sibility for violations committed in the course of internal armed conflicts, the
Trial Chamber determined that there was no principled reason to exclude this
form of liability in such contexts.1 55 Indeed, the Trial Chamber noted that "[t]he
gravity of the participation in a joint criminal enterprise cannot depend on the
nature of the conflict," and that this form of liability ensured "an efficient
prosecution."' 156 In other words, "[t]he nature of the conflict is not relevant to
the responsibility of the perpetrator."' 57 The Trial Chamber did note, however,
that conflict classification remained relevant to determine chargeable crimes.
158
Responding to defendants' arguments that a prosecution under a JCE theory
of liability for crimes committed in a non-international armed conflict would
infringe the principle of NCSL, the Trial Chamber noted that the accused had
sufficient notice that they could be held criminally liable for taking part in the
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTR Statute as part of a
JCE. The Trial Chamber was satisfied that the precedents employed to establish
the existence of JCE liability in international armed conflicts provided the
necessary notice to defendants embattled in internal armed conflicts. It rea-
soned:
innovation, as the ICTY Statute does not specifically list it as a punishable form of liability and
excludes liability for conspiracy to commit the enumerated crimes. See Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 7(1), Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. In finding JCE liability to be a form of "commission," the
ICTY relied upon the object and purpose of the Statute and the nature of international crimes, which are
often "manifestations of collective criminality." Tadie, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para. 191 (July
15, 1999).
153. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defense's Preliminary Motions Challenging
Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 16.
154. Id. para. 33. In this regard, the Trial Chamber also found the doctrine of JCE applicable to a
prosecution for genocide, even though the Genocide Convention (at Article II) and the ICTR Statute
(at Article 2(3)) only list five forms of punishable genocidal acts. Id. paras. 46-48. The Chamber
determined that Article 6(1) applied to all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and that the
specific provisions on genocide provide additional grounds on which individuals may be prosecuted for
genocide that are not applicable to other crimes (for example, conspiracy and incitement). Id. para. 47;
see also Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004).
155. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defense's Preliminary Motions Challenging
Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 36 ("The Chamber does not perceive any difference
between the structure of international crimes committed in the course of international armed conflicts
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[t]here exist numerous judicial decisions, international instruments and domes-
tic legislations which convey that the commission of crimes under the Statute
through participation in a joint criminal enterprise would entail criminal
responsibility. Even if the aforementioned judicial decisions refer to conflicts
of an international character, any potential perpetrator was able to understand
that the criminalization of acts of such gravity did not depend on the interna-
tional or internal nature of the armed conflict.
159
In this body of jurisprudence, the ICTY has essentially merged the law
relevant to international and non-international armed conflicts and rendered
conflict classification a more nuanced and ultimately less essential exercise.
160
Three strands of arguments underlie the tribunals' justification for these develop-
ments. One conflates illegality and criminality and postulates that a treaty's
silence as to the penal consequences of a breach does not, ipso facto, mean
treaty breaches are not crimes. 16 1 This position is articulated even where sister
treaties expressly provide for criminal penalties, which might imply the oppo-
site result. When forced to explain these treaty silences, tribunals reason that
states intended to leave details of enforcement to parties and the international
community rather than mandate any particular enforcement regime. 162 This
approach disregards, however, the obvious counter-explanation that drafting
states made a deliberate choice not to criminalize such behavior and instead
adopt only state responsibility.
A second justification, perhaps more germane to the Nuremberg era, con-
cedes the lack of express criminalization of certain acts, but argues that retroac-
tive justice. is preferable .to the alternative enforcement options, which include
impunity, extrajudicial forms of collective responsibility (for example, sanc-
tions, reprisals, reparations, or territorial concessions), and summary execution.
Had the WWII Allies not initiated their experiment with international justice,
most of the defendants may have been summarily executed and the German
159. Id. para. 44.
160. As a result of these rulings, the Office of the Prosecutor has brought most war crimes charges
before the ICTY under the catch-all Article 3 rather than Article 2, which incorporates the grave
breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions..A charge under Article 3 obviates the need to prove the
existence of an international armed conflict in the relevant region of the former Yugoslavia, a highly
complex task where international involvement by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Repub-
lic of Croatia in the newly independent Bosnia-Herzegovina was clandestine and subtle. Article 3 now
essentially does all the work of Article 2 and more.
161. See Kanyabashi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-15-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on the Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 16 (June 3, 1999).
162. See Prosecutor v. Delalid, Muci6, Deli6 & Landlo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 176
(Nov. 16, 1998) ("While 'grave breaches' must be prosecuted and punished by all States, 'other'
breaches of the Geneva Conventions may be so."). This result harkens back to the ancient Lotus
principle whereby that which is not affirmatively prohibited is permitted. See generally S.S. Lotus (Fr.
v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
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people condemned and punished en masse. 6 3 The assignment of individual
criminal responsibility before a court of law, even retroactively, is a more
progressive and fair form of norm enforcement.' 64 Courts adjudicating ICL thus
reason that NCSL dilemmas must be evaluated against the available alternatives.
Third, the tribunals are quite overt about updating and modernizing old law in
light of modem realities. The Appeals Chamber in TadiM6, for example, found
that national policies and the inroads made by the international human rights
regime into areas traditionally shrouded by state sovereignty have "blur[red] the
traditional dichotomy between international wars and civil strife.' 65 In addi-
tion, as most modem global conflicts are internal or internationalized in charac-
ter, the distinction between the two bodies of law has seemed increasingly
arbitrary and outmoded to modem tribunals.1 66 ICL tribunals thus evince a
"normative bias" visible in other forms of international legal discourse favoring
"international legal completeness, predictability, coherence, and dynamism'
' 67
at the expense of strict textualism or deference to the prior intentions of states.
This quest for coherence often leads to decisions that render ICL a more
comprehensive and holistic body of law. In this way, tribunals utilize the
existence of a norm in one context (international armed conflicts) to provide
both notice and a rule of decision in another context (non-international armed
conflicts). This is the case regardless of whether states may have had reasoned
motives for creating distinct legal regimes between international and non-
international armed conflicts. The near complete merger of the criminal law
relevant to all classes of armed conflict now finds positive expression in Article
8 of the ICC Statute, indicating that this synthetic approach has been in large
measure, although not entirely, ratified by the community of states.
D. ACTS MALUM IN SE
In addition to making the leap between illegality and criminality, the tribunals
have also invoked the link between immorality and criminality and rejected the
163. See Robert Gellately, Introduction to LEON GoLDE'tsoHN, THE NUREMBERG INTERVIEws, at vii,
vii-xiv (Robert Gellately ed., 2004) (recounting proposals by the United States, the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union to execute the Nazi defendants).
164. See Kelsen, supra note 62, at 165 (noting that collective sanctions are a feature of "primitive
law").
165. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 83 (Oct. 2, 1995).
166. Id. para. 97 ("Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the
wanton destruction of hospitals ... when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from
the same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted 'only' within the
territory of a sovereign State?"); see also Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 172 ("In light
of the fact that the majority of the conflicts in the contemporary world are internal, to maintain a
distinction between the two legal regimes and their criminal consequences in respect of similarly
egregious acts because of the difference in nature of the conflicts would ignore the very purpose of the
Geneva Conventions, which is to protect the dignity of the human person.").
167. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Politi-
cal Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 258 (2004).
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defense of NCSL in situations in which the conduct in question is deemed
malum in se. Tribunals have reasoned that, When conduct shocks the conscience
of the international community, no formal notice of its penal consequences is
necessary to prosecute offenders. In other words, where atrocities are at issue,
no innocents are ensnared when prosecutions proceed in the absence of prior
positive law. As Justice Jackson argued at Nuremberg, "[t]he refuge of the
defendants can be only their hope that International Law will lag so far behind
the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is crime in the moral sense must
be regarded as innocent in law." '168 This rhetoric retains contemporary currency.
As one ICTY Trial Chamber argued, "It]he purpose of this principle [NCSL] is
to prevent the prosecution and punishment of an individual for acts which he
reasonably believed to be lawful at the time of their commission. It strains
credibility to contend that the accused would not recognize the criminal nature
of the acts alleged in the Indictment."' 169 The ICTY Appeals Chamber noted
that,
Although the immorality or appalling character of an act is not a sufficient
factor to warrant its criminalization under customary international law, it may
in fact play a role in that respect, insofar as it may refute any claim by the
Defence that it did not know of the criminal nature of the acts. 170
By this reasoning, the NCSL principle protects only "legitimate confidence."
171
This presumption of fair notice is applied even where novel forms of liability
are contested. The notion of malum in se is perhaps attenuated in circumstances
in which a defendant may know that certain conduct being committed by the
primary perpetrator is wrong (and thus inevitably criminal), but arguably does
not consider his particular contribution to such conduct to be equally as
iniquitous (and thus as likely to render him vulnerable to penal sanctions
through principles of secondary or vicarious liability). In Tadi6, for example, the
defendant was convicted on appeal of participating in a joint criminal enterprise
(JCE) to commit international crimes, even though the ICTY Statute does not
168. ROBERT H. JACKSON, Tim NiJRNBERG CASE 94 (1947).
169. Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 313 (allowing the prosecution of violations in
the face of defense arguments that such offenses do not give rise to individual criminal responsibility).
The ICTY Appeals Chamber ruled that, "[ilt is universally acknowledged that the acts enumerated in
common Article 3 are wrongful and shock the conscience of civilized people" and thus were "criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations" within the meaning
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-A,
Judgment, para. 173 (Feb. 20, 2001); see also Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, 8ainovi6 & Ojdani6, Case No.
IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanid's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, para. 42 (May 21, 2003) (noting that "due to the lack of any written norms or standards, war
crimes courts have often relied upon the atrocious nature of the crimes charged to conclude that the
perpetrator of such an act must have known that he was committing a crime").
170. Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdani's Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 42.
171. Tomuschat, supra note 14, at 835.
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include JCE liability as a form of responsibility, and the indictment did not
allege such a theory.1 72 In noting that international crimes are often the result of
"manifestations of collective criminality," the Appeals Chamber concluded that
"the moral gravity of such participation is often no less--or indeed no different-
from that of those actually carrying out the acts in question."
' 173
These statements, which elide the morally wrong and the legally criminal,
invoke the natural law tradition found in all international law. This tradition is
particularly cogent in ICL, which has as its origins the belief that the law must
conform to a universal transnational morality and conception of justice. 174
Many ICL cases proceed as though a transcendent law exists that has yet to be
reduced to positive law but that can be discovered and invoked in criminal
proceedings. Because such moral rules are considered universally and intrinsi-
cally knowable, the prior articulation of the consequences of engaging in
contrary conduct is deemed unnecessary. Courts adjudicating serious violations
of ICL thus envision themselves as operating in a realm of greater moral
certainty that, it is argued, justifies a less strict application of NCSL.175
It is perhaps not surprising that jurists would "turn to ethics" 176 in the face of
atrocities, when a desire to ensure the confluence of law and morality is likely to
be at its strongest.1 77 Historically, international law development has been at its
most active in reaction to a breakdown in international order. As Lord Wright
noted when considering the immediate post-WWII period, "[t]he period of
[international law] growth generally coincides with the period of world upheav-
als. The pressure of necessity stimulates the impact of natural law and of moral
ideas and converts them into rules of law deliberately and overtly recognized by
the consensus of civilized mankind." 17 8 In this way, tribunals appear compelled
to respond to "innovations in cruelty" where positive law is silent.1 79 Indeed, it
is precisely because classical international law was premised on state consent to
self-regulation that it is so susceptible to equal and opposite natural law
impulses.
172. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, paras. 172-75 (July 15, 1999).
173. Id. para. 191.
174. Stefan Glaser, La Mithode d'Interpretation en Droit International Penal, 9 RIVISTA ITALtANA DI
DTrrro E PROCEDURA PENAuI 757, 762-64 (1966).
175. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No, IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 75 (Oct. 7, 1997) ("The purview of the International Tribunal
relates to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in armed conflicts of extreme violence
with egregious dimensions. We are not concerned with the actions of domestic terrorists, gang-leaders
and kidnappers. We are concerned that, in relation to the most heinous crimes known to humankind, the
principles of law to which we give credence have the appropriate normative effect upon soldiers
bearing weapons of destruction and upon the commanders who control them in armed conflict
situations.").
176. See Martti Koskenniemi, "The Lady Doth Protest Too Much": Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics
in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REv. 159 (2002).
177. Wright, supra note 13, at 40 (arguing that all of law must reflect "the instincts of justice and
humanity which are the common heritage of' humankind).
178. Id. at51.
179. GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENratcE: THE POLITCS OF WAR CRPAms TumtuNALs 25 (2001).
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This reasoning is most palatable when applied to mass atrocities and heinous
conduct that, for whatever reason, falls outside of positive law. Tribunals
limited to adjudicating only the most "serious" of ICL violations1 80 can perhaps
more easily execute this leap from contra bonos mores to prosecutable crime.
This move is increasingly difficult with respect to acts that are more morally
neutral or contested. In Prosecutor v. Norman, for example, the defendant was
prosecuted for the enlistment and use of child soldiers in combat.18 1 Putting
forcible conscription to the side, even the enlistment and use of child soldiers,
while anathema to Western sensibilities that exalt the inviolability of childhood,
is not necessarily universally condemned as intrinsically wrong or immoral.
Indeed, the number of child soldiers in Africa could suggest the existence of a
regional custom with respect to the practice.18 2 The unfortunate ubiquity of the
practice of using child soldiers is reflected in the fact that some older human
rights treaties plead for the progressive elimination of the practice rather than
unequivocally compel desistance.
1 8 3
E. NOTICE ANYWHERE IS NOTICE EVERYWHERE
In considering NCSL defenses, jurists often make use of the multiplicity of
sources of international law set forth in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)-multilateral treaties, international custom,
"the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," and (as subsid-
iary means) judicial decisions and the writings of publicists-to either identify
an applicable rule of decision or otherwise conclude that the defendant was
effectively and sufficiently "on notice" that his conduct was unlawful.18 4 These
disparate sources of law may articulate different standards with respect to the
180. The statutes of the ad hoc tribunals contain language limiting their jurisdiction to "serious
violations of international humanitarian law." See ICTY Statute, supra note 152, at art. 1; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 1, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov.
8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The ICC Statute ups the ante to "the most serious crimes of
international concern." ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 1. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia are to prosecute "senior leaders" of the Khmer Rouge and those "most responsible" for
international crimes. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art.
2, Oct. 27, 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006 [hereinafter ECCC Statute]. Likewise, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone is prosecuting "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations" of IHL.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1(1), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138, available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
181. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion
Based on Lack of Jurisdiction, paras. 2-7 (May 31, 2004).
182. See Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266, 276-77 (recognizing the possibility of
regional custom).
183. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. A
2000 Optional Protocol raises the age of conscription to eighteen and obliges states parties to take "all
feasible measures" to refrain from using children in direct hostilities. See Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res.
54/263, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263, entered into force Feb. 12, 2002.
184. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(a)-(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, pt.
2, 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
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same subject matter, and international law has only rudimentary rules for
reconciling competing sources of authority. 185 According to the ICL "rule of
recognition"'186 adopted by the ICL tribunals, so long as some source of law
provides either a rule of decision or sufficient notice of prohibited conduct (and
these two inquiries are often intertwined), the principle of NCSL is satisfied.
1. Treaties
International tribunals will look to the relevant state's treaty obligations to
determine whether defendants were bound by a particular rule at the time of the
acts charged or otherwise on notice of prohibited conduct for the purposes of
resolving NCSL defenses. In Gali6, for example, the defendant was charged
with inflicting terror on the civilian population under Article 3 of the ICTY
Statute 187 in violation of Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol 1188 and Article
13(2) of Additional Protocol H.189 Neither of these provisions contemplates
individual criminal liability or defines "inflicting terror" as a criminal offense.
Sua sponte, the Trial Chamber invoked the four-part test developed in Tadi6 and
determined that the offense was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. 190 In applying the second Tadi6 condition (that the rule be applicable
to the events in question), the Trial Chamber determined that the defendant was
bound by the rule as a function of the former Yugoslavia's treaty obligations.' 91
In particular, in a May 22, 1992 agreement, the parties specifically agreed to
bring into force several provisions of Additional Protocol I and committed
themselves to refrain from attacking the civilian population irrespective of
whether the conflict in Bosnia constituted an international armed conflict within
the meaning of that treaty.
192
With respect to the fourth Tadi6 condition requiring the criminality of the rule
185. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 95 (June 27) (noting
that the treaty norms do not necessarily supersede CIL).
186. See H.L.A. HART, Trm CONCErt OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining the concept of a rule of
recognition that "specif[ies] some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken
as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure
it exerts"); Lorenzo Gradoni, Nullum Crimen Sine Consuetudine: A Few Observations on How the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Has Been Identifying Custom (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author), available at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/english/pdf/Gradoni.PDF.
187. Prosecutor v. Galil, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, para. 64 (Dec. 5, 2003).
188. Protocol I, supra note 104, at art. 51(2) ("The civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.").
189. Protocol II, supra note 103, at art. 13(2) (same language as Article 51(2) of Protocol I).
190. Gali5, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, paras. 94-129.
191. Id. para. 25; see also Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, paras. 41-46
(Dec. 17, 2004) (noting that NCSL is satisfied where a state is already bound to a treaty containing the
applicable prohibition, regardless of whether the treaty or the rule constitutes customary international
law, and distinguishing prior cases that may have implied that the crime had to be part of customary
international law).
192. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, para. 24; see also Prosecutor v. Delalid,
Muci6, Delid & Landlo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 44 (Feb. 20, 2001) (noting that the May
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in question, the Trial Chamber determined that the charged conduct also consti-
tuted a grave breach of Additional Protocol I, specifically the crime of "[m]ak-
ing the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack," 193 even
though this was not the precise crime charged. Accordingly, it determined that
the basic conduct of attacking civilians was criminalized regardless of whether
the additional element of the specific intent to terrorize the victims was present. 194
In determining the existence of this IHL crime, the Trial Chamber declined to
confirm its customary status, determining that it was unnecessary to do so
because the rule applied via treaty law.
195
On appeal, Galid argued that treaty law alone, without grounding in custom-
ary international law, was insufficient to give the Tribunal jurisdiction over the
offense of the "international crime of terror."196 The Appeals Chamber noted
that the Tribunal has endeavored to confirm the customary status of relevant
norms in keeping with the Secretary General's command that the ICTY assert
jurisdiction only over those crimes that are "beyond doubt" part of customary
law. 19 7 This, it noted, was especially true where the operative treaty does not
specifically criminalize conduct or provide precise elements of crimes. Under
such circumstances, the Tribunal has looked to customary law to establish
individual criminal responsibility and the constitutive elements.1 98 The majority
of the Appeals Chamber then confirmed the Trial Chamber's reasoning regard-
ing the legality of the crime of inflicting terror on the civilian population, citing
a number of national laws penalizing conduct analogous to the charged crime,
including legislation from the former Yugoslavia.199 It noted that the applicable
treaty provisions charged did not articulate any new legal obligations but rather
codified "in a unified manner" the foundational IHL principles of distinction
and protection.2°
In dissent, Judge Schomburg of Germany argued that spreading terror among
the civilian population was prohibited by IHL, but was not a crime for which
22 Agreement rendered some of the norms derived from the law governing international armed
conflicts applicable in the war in the former Yugoslavia regardless of conflict classification).
193. Protocol I, supra note 104, at art. 85(3)(a).
194. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, para. 127.
195. Id. paras. 97, 138.
196. Prosecutor v. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, para. 79 (Nov. 30, 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
197. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, para. 94-96; see also Prosecutor v. Milutinovid,
gainovi6 & Ojdani6, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanid's Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 10 (May 21, 2003) ("[T]here is no reference in the report
of the Secretary-General limiting the jurisdiction rationae personae of the International Tribunal to
forms of liability provided by customary law. However, the principle of legality demands that the
Tribunal shall apply the law which was binding upon individuals at the time of the acts charged. And,
just as is the case in respect of the Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione materiae, that body of law must be
reflected in [CIL].").
198. Gali, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, para. 83.
199. Id. paras. 94-96.
200. Id. para. 87.
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defendant could be prosecuted or convicted.2 0 ' He considered state practice
criminalizing the conduct to be insufficient to conclude that the fourth Tadie
element was satisfied. 02 He also critiqued the majority's failure to consider
whether a prosecutable crime existed in both international and internal armed con-
flicts.'03 In conclusion, he raised the specter of politicization and warned that:
[i]t would be detrimental not only to the Tribunal but also to the future
development of international criminal law and international criminal jurisdic-
tion if our jurisprudence gave the appearance of inventing crimes-thus
highly politicizing its function-where the conduct in question was not
without any doubt penalized at the time when it took place. 20 4
In lieu of a conviction under Count 1, Judge Schomburg would have convicted
him under the counts concerning attacks on civilians for the same underlying
conduct, treating the terrorization of the civilian population as an aggravating
205circumstance at sentencing.
2. Customary International Law
Beyond treaty law, courts adjudicating ICL more frequently resort to custom-
ary international law (CIL) when an otherwise applicable treaty is silent,
ambiguous, or constrained in its articulation of a legal principle.0 6 Indeed,
courts will even resort to CIL when there is an extant treaty on a subject,20 7
although it is difficult to identify relevant state practice outside of the treaty
where the treaty is well subscribed to by states.20 8 Where CIL satisfies the
201. Galil, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg,
paras. 7-8 (Nov. 30, 2006).
202. Id. paras. 10-15, 20.
203. Id. para. 16.
204. Id. para. 21.
205. Id. para. 22.
206. The Nuremberg Tribunal signaled the importance of CIL when it noted that
[tihe law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states
which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles of justice
applied by jurists and practiced in military courts. This law is not static, but by continual
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more
than express and define for more accurate reference the principle of law already existing.
Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 19, at 464. Historically, adjudications of the law of war in the United
States provide additional examples of this approach. See, e.g., 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299 (1865)
(stating that the laws of war may be prosecuted even though they have not been defined by any act of
Congress).
207. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Mucid, Delid & Landio, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, paras. 302-03
(Nov. 16, 1998) ("The evidence of the existence of such customary law... may ... be extremely
difficult to ascertain, particularly where there exists a prior multilateral treaty which has been adopted
by the vast majority of States .... Despite these difficulties, international tribunals do, on occasion,
find that custom exists alongside conventional law, both having the same substantive content.").
208. See R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, in 129 RECuE. ma CouRS 64 (1971) (identifying the
paradox of finding CIL when a well-subscribed treaty occupies the field).
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principle of legality, NCSL is effectively reformulated as nullum crimen sine
jure, where jure includes other than positively enacted law.2" 9
A compelling example of this reasoning is found in a case emerging from the
Special Court for Sierra Leone.21° The defendant in question was Sam Hinga
Norman, the now-deceased former leader of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), a
pro-government militia group. The Indictment against Norman and others ac-
cused the defendants of systematically utilizing boys in armed combat, a
defining feature of the decade-long Sierra Leonean civil war in which more than
10,000 children served as soldiers in the country's three major armed forces.
Article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court contains a catch-all provision
permitting the prosecution for: "(c) Conscripting or enlisting children under the
age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively
in hostilities."2"' Norman moved to dismiss the count for lack of jurisdiction on
the basis of NCSL.
The defendant did not contest that IHL prohibited the recruitment of children
under the age of 15 years at the time he acted. He did, however, argue that such
acts were not criminal under IHL. In support, he noted that at the time of the
challenged acts: none of the major treaties addressing the recruitment of child
soldiers provided for criminal penalties; no states criminalized the conduct in
their national law or had prosecuted individuals for the offense; and Sierra
Leonean law was silent as to the age of recruitment. He argued that it was not
until the 2002 entry-into-force of the ICC Statute, which includes at Article
8(2)(b)(xxvi) the war crime of enlisting or recruiting child soldiers or using
them in combat, that the offense became a rule recognized by customary
international law outside of the ICC context.
While noting its "duty" to respect NCSL,212 the majority pointed to certain
legal instruments and developments that predated the establishment of the
Special Court's Statute and that, in its estimation, revealed a customary rule in
existence prior to the relevant time period. Conceding that the crime first
entered the positive law in 1998 with the promulgation of the ICC Statute, the
Special Court nonetheless pointed to state proposals and early drafts of the
Statute as evidence of the emergence of a customary norm.213 Though declining
to identify exactly when such a norm "crystallized," which it asserted was
frequently impossible to do with respect to the development of CIL, the Special
Court stated that it could identify a period of time when the international
209. M. CHERMi BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HuMANIrry IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 144 (2d ed.
1999) (suggesting that the principle of legality in ICL should be reformulated as noted given that it does
not rely exclusively on written law (lege) but also encompasses unwritten customary rules (jure)).
210. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion
Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004).
211. SCSL Statute, supra note 180, at art. 4(c).
212. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack
of Jurisdiction, para. 25.
213. Id. para. 33.
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community turned its attention to the problem of child soldiers that predated
both the promulgation of the Special Court's Statute and the defendant's
conduct.214 This norm, the majority reasoned, then took six years to find
positive expression in the ICC Statute as punishable behavior.
Judge Robertson, of the United Kingdom, lodged a cogent dissent, insisting
that a criminal tribunal had to ensure not only that conduct was prohibited when
committed by states, but also that states had intended the conduct to entail
individual penal consequences.21 5 He reasoned that the latter step had not yet
occurred with respect to the recruitment and enlistment of children in armed
conflict until, at the very earliest, the opening of the ICC Statute for signature in
1998, but-in any case-by the time the ICC Statute entered into force in 2002.
Judge Robertson took issue with the majority for conflating bad acts with
criminal conduct and argued that "it is precisely when the acts are abhorrent and
deeply shocking that the principle of legality must be most stringently applied,
to ensure that the defendant is not convicted out of disgust rather than evidence,
or of a non-existent crime.' 2 16 Given that Sierra Leonean law did not prohibit
child recruitment, he argued that there was no way for the embattled defendants
to reasonably ascertain, even through competent legal advice, that they were
committing a crime when they enlisted and recruited child soldiers. 21 7 He
concluded that however "inconvenient" the result, NCSL compelled the dis-
missal of the challenged charge.218
This reasoning finds echoes in the recent Scilingo case 219 before Spain's
Audiencia Nacional, a national court of first instance with special jurisdiction
over international crimes. Adolfo Scilingo was prosecuted for his complicity in
crimes committed during the reign of the Argentine military junta. Although the
investigating judge had charged him with terrorism, torture, and genocide-
three crimes that had long existed in the Spanish Crdigo Penal (Penal Code)
and were subject to universal jurisdiction 2 2 0 -the Audiencia convicted him of
crimes against humanity,22' which had only been codified in Spanish law in
2004,222 well after the acts of which Scilingo was accused had been committed.
The Audiencia rejected the defendant's argument that the prosecution was ex
post facto, reasoning that crimes against humanity were prohibited by custom-
ary international law at the time of the events in question. The court ruled that
214. Id. para. 50.
215. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack
of Jurisdiction, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, para. 2 (May 31, 2004).
216. Id. para. 12; see also id. para. 13 (noting that the fact that the accused's conduct would "shock
or even appall decent people is not enough to make it unlawful in the absence of a prohibition").
217. Id. para. 31.
218. Id. para. 12. The surviving defendants were convicted of the offense. Prosecutor v. Fofana,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2007).
219. SAN, Apr. 19, 2005 (R.J., No. 16/2005).
220. Art. 23.4 L.O.P.J.
221. SAN, Apr. 19, 2005 (R.J., No. 16/2005, 1.A., Fundamentos de Derecho, paras. 6-7).
222. Art. 607 C.P.
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the jus cogens and erga omnes nature of the customary international law
prohibition against crimes against humanity was implicitly incorporated into,
and thus directly applicable in, the Spanish domestic legal system.223 In so
ruling, the Audiencia determined that it would make allowance for the unique
characteristics of international law and for the crucial role that custom plays in
the ICL legal system. This is notwithstanding the fact that the definition of
crimes against humanity was in flux at the time the defendant acted, implicating
the principle of specificity. The Audiencia also cited analogous provisions in
Argentine domestic law, which it ruled were sufficient to put the defendant on
notice of potential penalties for his conduct. 224 Nonetheless, it sentenced Sci-
lingo pursuant to Article 607bis of the Spanish Code and not the provisions of
domestic law. This ruling is significant because the Spanish Constitution specifi-
cally incorporates the principle of legality in several places.225
On appeal, the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) upheld the conviction, but
rejected the Audiencia's reasoning.226 It ruled that although the defendant did
commit crimes against humanity as they are defined under international law by
contributing to a state-sponsored policy to eradicate subversion, 227 CIL is not
directly applicable within the Spanish system and thus could not create a
"complete criminal offense" that was prosecutable in the Spanish courts. 228
Instead, the Supreme Court ruled that it would substitute a conviction for the
well-established domestic crimes of murder and illegal detention. 229 That Span-
ish law did not provide universal jurisdiction over such municipal crimes was of
no moment because they also constituted crimes against humanity subject to
universal jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that they were closely related to (if
not lesser-included offenses of) the crimes of genocide and war crimes over
which universal jurisdiction existed as a matter of statutory law and CIL.2 30
Thus, although crimes against humanity did not provide the appropriate substan-
tive charge against the defendant, the fact that the acts in question nonetheless
constituted crimes against humanity gave the Spanish courts universal jurisdic-
tion over them.23' The Supreme Court concluded that the universal jurisdiction
223. SAN, Apr. 19, 2005 (R.J., No. 16/2005, 1.B., Fundamentos de Derecho, para. 1).
224. See generally Giulia Pinzauti, An Instance of Reasonable Universality: The Scilingo Case, 3
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1092 (2005); Christian Tomuschat, Issues of Universal Jurisdiction in the Scilingo
Case, 3 J. INr'L CRIM. JUST. 1074 (2005).
225. See Art. 25 C.E. ("No one may be sentenced or fined for actions or omissions that at the time of
occurrence were not a crime, misdemeanor or administrative offence pursuant to valid legislation in
effect at that time."); Art. 9.3 (guaranteeing the principle of legality); see also Art. 2 C.P. ("A crime or
misdemeanor shall not be punished with a penalty not included in the law prior to the perpetration
thereof.").
226. STS, Nov. 8, 2007 (R.J., No. 789/2007).
227. Id. paras. 70-75.
228. Id. para. 64.
229. Id. paras. 69-71.
230. Id. para. 71.
231. This disaggregative reasoning finds analogy in Bivens-a U.S. Supreme Court case-and Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) litigation, in which the Constitution and international law, respectively, provide the
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law was merely a procedural law whose extension by analogy did not implicate
the principle of specificity. 232 The Supreme Court then sentenced Scilingo based
upon the Spanish penal code, which was more lenient than the Argentine code,
because the former provided maximum penalties for the crimes in question.233
In looking to CIL to "fill gaps" in positive law, 234 courts are not rigorous
about applying the traditional CIL formula, which requires a showing of state
practice coupled with opinio juris sive necessitatis. Rather, courts are often
willing to overlook or discount contrary state practice and prioritize articula-
tions of opinio juris235 found in the pronouncements of states and other institu-
tions, including nongovernmental or intergovernmental organizations.236 Under
this contemporary approach, contrary state practice may be considered a breach
of a rule rather than evidence of the absence or desuetude of a rule. Jurists may
also "double count" discursive practices as both usus and opinio juris.23 7 It is of
course uncontroversial that the substance of CIL is inherently evolutionary, 38
being premised on the actions of states and their conceptions and articulations
of legal obligation. The current practice of international decision-making bodies
suggests that the very concept of CIL is undergoing a transformation in light of
the proliferation of multilateral international institutions, providing dispersed
fora for parliamentary diplomacy and discursive practices. 2 39 Although this
rule of decision, and the right of action is a creature of federal common law. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004) (explaining the ATS's operation).
232. STS, Nov. 8, 2007 (R.J., No. 789/2007, paras. 70-71).
233. Id. para. 74. Given the NCSL provision in the Spanish Constitution, this judgment will
inevitably be appealed to the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court). See generally Gil Gil,
supra note 64; Pinzauti, supra note 224; Tomuschat, supra note 224.
234. Tribunals will rely on CIL to establish the existence of forms of responsibility as well as
substantive offenses. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, ainovi6 & Ojdani6, Case No. IT-99-37-
AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdani6's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise,
para. 41 (May 21, 2003) (finding that the rules of customary law were sufficient to support a
prosecution under the joint-criminal-enterprise theory of liability).
235. This is the case in other areas of public international law reasoning as well. See Theodor
Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 238, 239 (1996) (noting that opiniojuris weighs more heavily in IHL than state practice, which
frequently contravenes articulated norms).
236. Gradoni, supra note 186, at 4-5 (explaining ICTY's methodology for identifying custom and
noting reliance on the work of the International Law Commission and the drafting history of the ICC
Statute).
237. One study notes that the ICTY has considered the following as evidence of state practice:
signatures to, ratifications of, and accessions to treaties; resolutions adopted by institutional organiza-
tions; decisions of domestic tribunals; internal legislation and policy statements (for example, military
manuals); acquiescence in other state practice; and unilateral action that may not have been projected
onto the international plane. Id. at 8. The frequency of citation suggests that the Tribunal is most
influenced by the practices of the United States, Western Europe, and Russia. Id. at 13 fig.7.
238. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (tracing the historical development of
a rule of customary international law).
239. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens,
and General Principles, 12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1992) (critiquing the tendency to view CIL as
formed "through proclamation, exhortation, repetition, incantation, lament").
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untethering of opinio juris from state practice is part of much public interna-
tional law reasoning, it is particularly common in ICL, where the disjunction
between the two elements can be so wide.24° In ICL, states are known to
espouse lofty rhetoric in self-serving dialogue just as violations continue in
clandestine cells back home.
The "ostensible contradiction" between the principle of legality and a custom-
ary form of law is troubling. 241 Allowing unwritten ICL norms to provide fair
warning to a defendant of an operative rule of decision and the penal standards
by which he will be judged implicates two aspects of the NCSL principle: the
defendant's knowledge of the existence of the prohibition and its precise content
(the requirement of specificity). The former is more easily satisfied in light of
the web of human rights treaties articulating unequivocal prohibitions, but not
necessarily setting forth precise elements of crimes. It is more difficult to accept
that the precise elements of crimes can be gleaned from the (at times) divergent
conduct of the multiplicity of states coupled with their subjective psychological
attitudes toward a particular practice.242 In this regard, it is more reasonable to
charge states rather than individuals with the duty of tracking CIL because
states are more used to operating on the international plane and have access to
the dispersed practices of states. Nonetheless, where a customary norm finds
parallel expression in some other source of law-such as extant domestic law of
the nationality or territorial state or even general principles of law within the
community of states-the ICL tribunals have relied upon CIL to defeat argu-
ments that the NCSL principle is being infringed.
3. General Principles of Law
In addition to CIL, courts will also canvass domestic law to identify appli-
cable general principles of law. 243 While drafting the ICC Statute, some mem-
240. One commentator has characterized this as a sliding-scale methodology: "[Tlhe more destabiliz-
ing or morally distasteful the activity... the more readily international decision makers will substitute
one element [of CIL] for the other, provided that the asserted restrictive rule seems reasonable."
Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 Am. J. INT'L L. 146, 149 (1987).
241. Gradoni, supra note 186, at 1; see also BooT, supra note 1, at 20 ("[J]urists practicing criminal
law tend to become somewhat nervous when reference is made to 'customary international law' as a
basis for individual criminal responsibility .... ); Lamb, supra note 25, at 743 ("[T]he nullum crime
principle, which relies on expressed prohibitions and is based explicitly upon the value of legal
certainty, sits uneasily with the very nature -of customary international law, which is unwritten and
frequently difficult to define with precision.").
242. See M. CHERu' BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCnON TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 225 (2003) (noting the
two dimensions of NCSL).
243. See Prosecutor v. Blakid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, paras. 34-42 (July 29, 2004)
(canvassing national law to determine the mental element of ordering offenses). The general-principles-
of-law inquiry allows for the "distillation" of a general principle without a "comprehensive survey" but
requires more than the consideration of one national legal system. See Milutinovid, 8ainovid & Ojdani,
Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdani6's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, para. 41 (May 21, 2003) (observing that "although domestic law (in particular the
law of the country of the accused) may provide some notice to the effect that a given act is regarded as
criminal under international law, it may not necessarily provide sufficient notice of that fact"). Although
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bers of the International Law Commission determined that general principles of
law were not precise enough to serve as the direct basis of penal responsibil-
ity.2 4 Nonetheless, tribunals have treated such principles as sufficiently robust
to provide notice to the defendant of a novel construction of ICL. s For
example, in Furundija, the Trial Chamber resorted to general principles of law
by seeking "principles of criminal law common to the major legal systems of
the world" to determine that forcible oral intercourse could be charged as rape
and hence as a war crime." 6 While some IHL treaties prohibit rape, none
concretely defines the crime.24 7 From its survey of national legislation, the
Chamber discerned a trend toward "broadening the definition of rape so that it
now embraces acts that were previously classified as comparatively less serious
offences, that is sexual or indecent assault., 248 At the same time, the Chamber
noted that many states, including the defendant's own, would treat such acts as
the lesser crime of assault.
2 49
The Trial Chamber ultimately determined that the rape charge was justified
by reference to the object and purpose of the relevant law, which it identified as
follows:
The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as
human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person,
whatever his or her gender .... This principle is intended to shield human
beings from outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are
carried out by unlawfully attacking the body or by humiliating and debasing
the honour, the self-respect or the mental well being of a person.2
50
In so ruling, the Trial Chamber invoked the object and purpose of IHL to justify
the expansion of the international prohibition beyond what the operative domes-
tic law would have provided. Drafters of the ICC's Elements of Crimes have
this is the dominant view of the directionality of general principles of law, an alternative view suggests
that general principles of law can also emerge from international sources and then trickle down to the
domestic context. See Simma & Alston, supra note 239, at 102.
244. See BooT, supra note 1, at 330.
245. See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 135 (Oct. 2, 1995) (noting that "substantive justice and
equity" confirmed that the defendants could be prosecuted for violations of treaties that did not include
penal provisions in light of the fact that the national law of the former Yugoslavia had incorporated such
breaches into domestic law, so "[n]ationals of the former Yugoslavia... were therefore aware, or
should have been aware, that they were amenable to the jurisdiction of their national criminal courts in
cases of violation of international humanitarian law"). The appellate ruling did not alter the accused's
sentence because the war crimes counts were cumulative charges, and so the sentences would run
concurrently. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R1 17, Sentencing Judgment, para. 32 (Nov. 11, 1999).
246. Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, para. 177 (Dec. 10, 1998).
247. See, e.g., Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 67, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
248. Furundtija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, para. 179.
249. Id. para. 182.
250. Id. para. 183.
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since codified this result.25 1
Separate and apart from identifying any particular "general principle[] of law
recognized by civilized nations," tribunals will even cite particular domestic law
as a source of advance notice that certain conduct is prohibited.252 While some
international crimes are sui generis, many others have analogs in the crimes
found in the majority of domestic penal codes. For example, an act of murder
becomes a crime against humanity when it is committed in the context of a
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population with knowledge
of that attack.2 53 Thus, the definitions of these domestic analogs differ only in
that they lack the chapeau elements that internationalize such crimes and render
them prosecutable before an international tribunal.254 Tribunals have reasoned
that the prohibition in domestic law of the predicate act provides sufficient
notice of the wrongfulness and criminality of the underlying conduct, even
when the act is prosecuted under an unprecedented international law analog that
requires a showing of additional elements, such as the existence of an armed
conflict or discriminatory intent.255 By this reasoning, the novelty of these
additional elements is not enough to infringe the NCSL principle. This willing-
ness to rely on notice of the illegality of the underlying conduct in question is
apparent in the Hadihasanovie decision, wherein the Trial Chamber empha-
sizes that NCSL relates to "the factual criminality of particular conduct" not
necessarily its particular characterization under ICL.256 In Kupregki6, the domes-
tic law analog is even considered technically more akin to a lesser-included
offense of the international offense to be prosecuted. 57
Under this approach, the chapeau elements are treated more as jurisdictional
or aggravating elements, rendering what would otherwise be established domes-
tic crimes prosecutable before an international tribunal. Where this line of
251. Elements of Crimes, stipra note 72, at art.7(l)(g)-I (defining rape to include oral intercourse).
252. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, gainovi6 & Ojdanid, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision
on Dragoljub Ojdani6's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, paras. 40-41 (May
21, 2003) (noting that national law-particularly from the accused's home state-can provide notice of
prohibited conduct or forms of responsibility, and finding that Yugoslavian law allowed for prosecu-
tions based on a joint-criminal-enterprise theory of responsibility).
253. See ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 7. Indeed, one commentator has noted that ICL merely
"introduce[d] a new nomenclature for long recognized offences." L.C. Green, The Maxim Nullum
Crimen Sine Lege and the Eichmann Trial, 38 Brr. YB. INiT'L L. 457, 461 (1962).
254. As Justice Jackson argued in his letter to President Truman outlining his plan for the Nurem-
berg prosecutions, "We propose to punish acts which have been regarded as criminal since the time of
Cain and have been so written in every civilized code." Jackson Report, supra note 35, at pt. mI.
255. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Mucid, Deli6 & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 312 (Nov.
16, 1998). In Delali6, the Trial Chamber responded to the defendants' NCSL argument by pointing out
that the criminal code of the former Yugoslavia, adopted by the newly independent Bosnia-
Herzegovina, criminalized all of the acts prohibited by Common Article 3.
256. Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovid, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Interlocutory Appeal on Decision on
Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, para. 62 (Nov. 12, 2002).
257. See Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, paras. 681-87 (Jan. 14, 2000)
(applying the common law concept of lesser-included offenses to international crimes). In the civil law
tradition, the more specific offense consumes the more general one. Id. para. 688.
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argument is accepted, defendants are left to argue only that they could not have
reasonably foreseen being prosecuted before an international tribunal, as op-
posed to a domestic one, for the acts in question. Retroactive exercises of
jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction before courts that did not exist prior to the
defendants' actions or jurisdiction before courts that would not have had
jurisdiction prior to the defendants' actions, are of such a substantially different
nature as to be largely outside the domain of NCSL.258 Indeed, in a rejection of
classical legal positivism that postulates rule and sanction as inextricably linked,
it was argued at Nuremberg that the relevant international law was in existence
even absent a forum for its enforcement. Thus, the British Chief Prosecutor
argued that the "only innovation" that the Charter introduced was the creation
of "machinery, long overdue, to carry out the existing law.' 259 As many of the
cases suggest, the characterization of the crime prosecuted as an international
crime is of no moment when a defendant had notice that the underlying conduct
was proscribed by domestic law.26
4. Judicial Opinions
Judicial opinions-from international or domestic courts-may also provide
notice to defendants of prohibited acts. Since the establishment of the Intema-
258. Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 183 (1891) (noting that "an ex post facto law... does not
involve, in any of its definitions, a change of the place of trial of an alleged offence after its
commission") (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d
571, 582-83 (1985) (allowing for the extradition of the defendant to Israel, which did not exist at the
time of the alleged crimes, for ICL crimes); Caso Scilingo, STS, Nov. 8, 2007 (R.J., No. 789/2007,
para. 63) (noting that there is no NCSL problem where the Security Council created the ICTY and
ICTR after many of the crimes to be adjudicated were committed).
259. 19 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIANALs BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MurLARY TRuBuNAL 464
(1948); see also id. at 463 ("[T]he existence of law has never been dependent on the existence of a
correlated sanction external to the law itself."); Stanley L. Paulson, Classical Legal Positivism at
Nuremberg, 4 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 132, 151-55 (1975).
260. This interplay between international crimes and their domestic analogs finds parallels in the
way in which international tribunals manage complementarity, ne bis in idem (double jeopardy), and
requests for deferral or referral to domestic courts. For example, the ICC's complementarity regime
functions similarly to the NCSL jurisprudence. The principle of complementarity bars the ICC from
asserting jurisdiction where a competent domestic court is prosecuting an individual, even if the
conduct had been charged as a domestic rather than an international crime. A case is thus inadmissible
if 'the person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint"
before the ICC. ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 17(l)(c) (emphasis added). This formulation suggests
that where the underlying conduct is subject to domestic prosecution, the principle of complementarity
bars the prosecution before the ICC. The ICC Statute's ne bis in idem provisions operate somewhat
differently. Domestic courts are free of any double jeopardy obligations where an individual has been
tried for an international crime before the ICC and is subsequently prosecuted for an ordinary crime in
a domestic court. See id. at art. 20(2) ("No person shall be tried by another court for [an ICC crime] for
which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court."). In other words, if a person
has been tried for the crime against humanity of torture before the ICC, a domestic court could also
prosecute that individual for battery. Immi Tallgren, Article 20: Ne bis in idem, in COMMrNTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMtNAL COURT 419, 428 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) (arguing that
domestic courts may re-prosecute the same defendant for a domestic crime without running afoul of the
ICC Statute's double jeopardy provisions).
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tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the first modem ad
hoc tribunal, international and hybrid fora have proliferated. In addition, na-
tional courts are increasingly adjudicating international crimes according to
principles of extraterritorial or extraordinary jurisdiction. The adjudication of
ICL is thus decentralized, and the field lacks a final arbiter exercising global
appellate jurisdiction to harmonize and rationalize divergent trends in the law.
Traditionally, judicial opinions have not been a primary source of interna-
tional law. As a doctrinal matter, the ICJ Statute's sources framework relegates
judicial opinions to a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law., 2 61 In addition, the various international criminal tribunals are not, strictly
speaking, bound by the precedent generated by sister courts.262 Nonetheless, the
elements of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute have been somewhat reordered in ICL,
with judicial decisions assuming a more exalted place in the sources pantheon.
Indeed, Article 21(2) of the ICC Statute elevates that court's own judicial
decisions in the hierarchy of sources of law, allowing-although still not
mandating-the Court to refer to "the principles and rules of law interpreted in
its previous decisions., 263 This marks a divergence in doctrine vis-A-vis general
public international law adjudication, which eschews stare decisis.26
Notwithstanding these formalities, it cannot be gainsaid that these courts rely
heavily on each other's jurisprudence in resolving all manner of questions
presented to them. 265 To be sure, this inquiry often gets filtered through the
middleman of CL,2 66 where judicial decisions are deemed to reflect CIL. This
cumulative practice arguably reveals the development of a weak form of stare
decisis in ICL that operates across adjudicative institutions. This trend is likely
to continue as the ICC becomes more active. Notwithstanding the promise of
Article 10 of the ICC Statute-which indicates that the substantive definitions
(and indeed all of Part 2) "shall [not] be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in
any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other
than this Statute"-it is inevitable that the jurisprudence of the ICC will
generate a powerful precedential pull on future tribunals that will impact the
field in profound ways.
261. ICJ Statute, supra note 184, at art. 38(1)(d).
262. The ICTY and ICTR share an Appeals Chamber, which has harmonized the jurisprudence
emanating from those tribunals to a certain extent. See Prosecutor v. Kuprelki6, Case No. IT-95-16-T,
Judgment, paras. 537-42 (Jan. 14, 2000) (discussing operation of stare decisis in the ICTY/R system).
Another partial exception is the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which provides at Article
20(3) that "[t]he judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions
of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda."
SCSL Statute, supra note 180, at art. 20(3).
263. ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 21(2).
264. See ICJ Statute, supra note 184, at art. 59.
265. See, e.g., Kuprefki6, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, para. 541 ("[Jludicial decisions may
prove to be of invaluable importance for the. determination of existing law.").
266. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide, para. 14 (Oct. 22,
2004) (noting the ICTY/R Appeals Chamber's reliance on judicial decisions for evidence of CIL).
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These cases suggest that the growing ICL jurisprudence can provide adequate
notice of applicable standards to potential defendants, even if such defendants
would never fall within the personal jurisdiction of the court of origin of the
rule in question. Judicial opinions--especially those responding to situations of
mass atrocity and emanating from international or quasi-international tribunals-
work as a form of notice in ICL because they are symbolically important as
juristic condemnations of unacceptable behavior.267 Being based on the tradi-
tion of reasoned decision, such decisions are able to articulate norms more
precisely than other sources of international law, such as resolutions emanating
from the General Assembly or other political bodies.
5. The Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists
At least one court has determined that even academic scholarship can provide
a kind of notice to defendants. The case against Nikola Jorgi6 in Germany
marked one of the first universal jurisdiction cases to be brought and the first
German prosecution for genocide since ratification of the Genocide Convention
in 1954.268 The crime of genocide is defined in Article 220a of the German
Criminal Code in a fashion identical to the Genocide Convention's definition.
Nonetheless, the German Constitutional Court interpreted this definition to
reach acts that might be considered "cultural genocide," a phenomenon that was
specifically excluded from the Genocide Convention. The court reasoned that
the intent to destroy the group "includes the annihilation of a group as a social
unit with its special qualities, uniqueness and its feeling of togetherness, not
exclusively their physical-biological annihilation. 269 Citing a General Assem-
bly resolution equating ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia with geno-
cide, the German court held that prohibited acts could include destroying or
looting houses or buildings of importance to the group, or the expulsion of
members of the group. The court reasoned that the prohibition against genocide"
protects legal interests that "lie[] beyond the individual, namely the social
existence of a group., 270 This, it noted, "has a broader meaning than physical-
biological annihilation., 271 The court concluded that this interpretation was
"within the margins of the possible interpretation of the international law
elements of the crime of genocide. 272 This was true, it reasoned, because
German scholars had advocated for this interpretation of the treaty.27 3 Jorgi6
267. See Amann, supra note 121, at 118 (noting the importance of having respected voices of
authority express moral condemnation).
268. See BVerfG, Dec. 12, 2000, docket number 2 BvR 1290/99, available at http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/rk20001212_2bvr129099en.html.
269. Id. para. 2.
270. Id. para. 2(a).
271. Id.
272. Id. para. 2(d).
273. See Jorgi6 v. Germany, App. No. 74613/01, paras. 27, 36, 47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 12, 2007),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/view.asp?item= 1 &portal=hbkm&action=html&
highlight= 74613/01 &sessionid = 8779548&skin=hudoc-en.
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was convicted of genocide and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Collectively, these cases reveal that tribunals, when considering whether the
core purpose of the NCSL principle is satisfied, are indifferent about the precise
origins of the necessary notice. This notice can come from a treaty obligation
(either by virtue of a multilateral treaty or a more local treaty obligation), CIL,
domestic law, or other indicia of the state of international law or the direction in
which it is moving. As long as notice of a rule or standard is available to the
defendant from some source, and not even necessarily one directly binding on
the defendant at the time he acted, the tribunals have found no breach of the
NCSL principle. Mirroring the fiction of notice employed in the domestic
context where the law has become increasingly inaccessible to ordinary people,
the international criminal law tribunals similarly assume defendants' ability to
undertake virtually global legal research to determine the scope and content of
ICL. Courts reason that as long as the defendant could reasonably ascertain in
advance that the particular conduct or form of participation is prohibited,
particularly with the help of competent counsel, the NCSL principle is satisfied.
This is especially true with respect to individuals to whom ICL is directly
addressed-soldiers and statesmen.274
III. NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE AS AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT
As the study of cases presented above reveals, NCSL is a frequent defense in
ICL in the face of novel substantive charges and forms of responsibility or
expansive interpretations of established doctrines. Through the use of a series of
interpretive devices, analytical claims, and methodological choices, ICL tribu-
nals have allowed defendants to be prosecuted for offenses, or under forms of
responsibility, that were not part of positive law at the time the defendants
acted. This is more than a modest process of "interpretation and clarifica-
tion, 275 but is in fact a more dramatic, if unacknowledged, form of judicial
lawmaking.276 The apparent willingness by courts to overlook the imperatives
of NCSL in the ICL context raises a number of legitimacy concerns, including
questions of whether international tribunals are upsetting the "constitutional"
allocation of authority between states and supranational courts in the interna-
274. Wright, supra note 13, at 44 ("The actual law with its specified offences and penalties may not
be familiar to a cheesemonger in the City of London, but must be taken to be known to all those who
have to act in the matter to which it relates, for instance, to statesmen, to military, naval and air officers
and even to soldiers in the lower ranks.").
275. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, paras. 126-27 (Mar. 24, 2000)
(stating that NCSL "does not prevent a court, either at the national or international level, from
determining an issue through a process of interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a
particular crime .... ).
276. See Wessel, supra note 132, at 386 (noting the distinction between "judicial gap-filling," which
occurs when courts resolve disputes by policy-making in situations in which legislatures have failed to
fully codify a particular rule, and 'judicial activism," which occurs when courts refuse "to implement
the announced public policy decisions of otherwise authoritative institutions").
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tional system 277 by departing from, expanding upon, or outright rejecting rules
carefully negotiated by states during multilateral treaty drafting processes.2 78
Despite the separation-of-powers component to NCSL, however, this principle
is primarily aimed at protecting criminal defendants, not state sovereignty. The
ICL cases discussed above are thus open to the criticism that courts are
trampling on the rights of criminal defendants in their rush to advance the ICL
system. In light of the centrality of procedural protections in international
human rights law, this Article focuses primarily upon these concerns, rather than
those regarding sovereignty, in evaluating the NCSL jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding that this process of judicial lawmaking in ICL often seems
to contravene a strict application of the principle of NCSL, the ICL jurispru-
dence is consistent with the purposes underlying the principle, the precise
formulations of the NCSL principle in omnibus human rights instruments, and
the concomitant interpretations emerging from authoritative institutions charged
with enforcing human rights protections. The European Court of Human Rights
in particular has established a two-part methodology for determining when a
domestic prosecution runs afoul of the NCSL provision set forth in that Court's
constitutive treaty. This methodology does not demand strict legality; rather,
domestic courts are to ensure that the crime prosecuted is in keeping with the
essence of existing crimes and that any innovation would have been foreseeable
to the defendant under the circumstances. The ICL tribunals' approach to the
defense of NCSL is largely consistent with this methodology.
The right to be prosecuted only for conduct that was criminalized ex ante is
enshrined in a number of human rights declarations and treaties, in part as a
reaction to the excesses of jurists working under National Socialism. 2 7 9 The
277. In domestic law, NCSL is, among other things, "a direct consequence of the theory of the
separation of powers" and a reflection of a rational system for organizing state authority. BOOT, supra
note 1, at 83. The separation-of-powers implications of disregarding the NCSL principle are somewhat
mitigated in the international system in which the familiar triad of government branches is not
reproduced mutatis mutandis. Accordingly, NCSL does not protect an analogous legislative authority;
rather, it protects the right of states to make rules that govern their relations with each other, with the
individuals within their jurisdiction, and between such individuals. Courts adjudicating ICL appear to
feel less compelled to respect the outcomes of these processes than they might the products of a
democratically elected legislature.
278. The cases addressed above may suggest that courts are exceeding their delegated authority and
dramatically refashioning the rules that states created for themselves. And yet, it has been argued that a
"residual lawmaking capacity of [international] judges may well be part of the intended design of'
some treaty regimes. See Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45
VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 641 (2005); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a Judicial
Tool for Promoting Efficiency, in Tim IMPACr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 85
(Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsh eds., 2004) (arguing for the efficiency of judicial lawmaking where
collective action problems among states prevent the emergence of necessary rules). For an application
of this theory to the IHL context, see generally Danner, supra note 74.
279. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 10, at art. 11(2); European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter ECPHRFF]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on Human Rights art. 9, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; African Charter on Human
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principle is formulated in many relevant texts to make important allowances for
international law norms.28 ° Unlike the U.S. formulation of the ex post facto
prohibition, these human rights formulations are addressed to all organs of
government and not just state legislatures, although there may be no "victim"
with standing before any supervisory body until ex post facto legislation is
applied by the corresponding judicial branch.
NCSL entered international human rights law in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), which states at Article 11(2) that "[n]o one shall be
held guilty of any penal offense on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, at the time it was
committed." 281 Drafters included the term "international law" to invoke Article
38 of the ICJ Statute, although a handful of states unsuccessfully argued that the
Declaration should refer only to positive law and not customary law. 282 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) builds on this
prohibition with the nulla poena sine lege admonition that "[n]or shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the
criminal offense was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the
offense, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby. 28 3 This provision in the ICCPR somewhat
redundantly (in light of Article 15(1)) goes on to emphasize that the principle is
satisfied where the act is criminalized at the international level even as a general
principle of law: "Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed,
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations. ' 284 According to one international judge, this implies
and Peoples' Rights art. 7, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
[hereinafter African Charter].
280. Touvier v. France, App. No. 29420/95, 88-B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 148, 161 (1997)
(noting that Article 7(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was
not meant "to affect laws which, in the wholly exceptional circumstances at the end of the Second
World War, were passed in order to punish war crimes, treason and collaboration with the enemy[,]"
and finding no violation where applicant was prosecuted for crimes against humanity).
281. UDHR, supra note 10, at art. 11(2); see also ICCPR, supra note 279, at art. 15(1) (containing
an analogous formulation); African Charter, supra note 279, at art. 7(2) (same). The African Charter,
however, does not contain a clause referencing international law as a source of law: "No one may be
condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it
was committed." African Charter, supra note 279, at art. 7(1).
282. The French translations of these provisions generally employ the word "droit" rather than "Ioi,"
implying that more than written law is at issue. Boor, supra note 1, at 146-47.
283. ICCPR, supra note 279, at art. 15(1). A similar formulation is found at Article 9 of the
American Convention of Human Rights although reference is made to "under the applicable law" rather
than to national and international law. American Convention, supra note 279, at art. 9. This provision
was meant to cover both international and domestic law. Bor, supra note 1, at 173; see also Protocol
II, supra note 103, at art. 6(2)(c) (requiring prior criminalization "under the law").
284. ICCPR, supra note 279, at art. 15(2). The latter provision has been interpreted to allow for
resort to general principles of law within the meaning of the ICJ Statute where no applicable treaty or
custom can be identified. See DAVID J. HARRIs ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CoNVErnON ON HUMAN
Riorrs 282 (1995) ("If there is no treaty binding upon the parties to a dispute and if no rule of
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that the provision is satisfied as long as the conduct was considered "fundamen-
tally criminal" by the community of nations.285 Virtually identical language
appears in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms.286 In many of these treaties, the NCSL provisions are non-
derogable, even in times of national emergency.
287
All human rights formulations of the NCSL principle invite courts to consider
the existence of legal prohibitions in both national and international law in
determining whether a prosecution adheres to the principle of legality. The
references to international law in many of these instruments were included
precisely to address the NCSL issues raised by the Nuremberg and Tokyo
proceedings and to ensure that either domestic law or the various sources of
international law could provide the necessary notice to defendants.288 These
treaties can thus be read to provide multilateral validation of the Nuremberg
approach to NCSL.28 9 In addition, these references establish the precedence of
international law over domestic law and are meant to ensure that individuals
customary international law based on state practice applies, recourse may be had to 'general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations,' i.e., by the state members of the international community, to fill
the gap."). Cassese suggests that this reference should have been to CIL and not to general principles of
law. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 149 n.27.
285. Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive
Development of Law?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1007, 1011 (2004).
286. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
287. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 279, at art. 4(2). IHL contains its own articulations of the NCSL
principle in the penal provisions of several treaties. For example, the Third Geneva Convention
(protecting prisoners of war (POWs)) at Article 99 states that POWs may not be tried or sentenced for
acts "not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the
said act was committed." Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 99, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; see also Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 247, at art. 67. Protocol I considers this prohibition to be a "fundamental
guarantee" in Article 75(4)(c), and Article 6(2)(c) of Protocol II applies the same principle to
individuals involved in non-international armed conflicts. Protocol I, supra note 104, at art. 75(4)(c);
Protocol H, supra note 103, at art. 6(2)(c).
288. See P. VAN DUK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 436 (1998); MANFIm NOWAK, U.N. COVENArr ON CrVIL AND POIT.mCAL RIGHTS, CCPR
CoMMENTARY 281 (2005); N. ROBINSON, THE UrNVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS OmRGINS,
SIGNICANCE, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION 116 (1958) (noting that Article 11(2) of the UDHR was
meant to signal the legality of the post-WWII proceedings); see also Prosecutor v. Delali6, Muci6, Deli
& Landlo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 313 (Nov. 16, 1998).
289. Likewise, in 1946, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 95(1) affirming the prin-
ciples of international law recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment without, however,
identifying those principles specifically. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized
by the Charter of the Ntirnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (1), at 1144, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946); see also Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
NUrnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. II, paras.
95-127, U.N. Doc. No. A/1316 (A/5/12) [hereinafter Principles of International Law], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles7-l-l950.pdf. Principle I1 states: "The
fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international
law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law."
Principles of International Law, supra, para. 99.
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cannot escape liability under international law by pleading that their actions
were lawful under national law.
290
The majority of these human rights and IHL provisions are addressed directly
to the states that have duly ratified the treaties in which they are found.291 As
such, they do not directly implicate international legislative or judicial institu-
tions. The UDHR, by contrast, proclaims the NCSL principle as a universal
right and a "common standard of achievement" for all peoples, all nations, and
"every organ of society.' ,2 92 In any case, the principles contained in the treaty
provisions arguably apply to international institutions such as ad hoc ICL
tribunals as well. Such provisions may apply: as a matter of customary law, as
general principles of law, or because such institutions are created via multilat-
eral action whereby formative and member states bring their treaty obligations
with them when they launch and associate with such bodies.
One formulation of NCSL specifically directed to an international penal
institution is found in the ICC Statute.293 That treaty codifies several strands of
the principle of legality.294 Article 22(1) dictates that "[a] person shall not be
criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question consti-
tutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 295
Article 24(2) provides that "[i]n the event of a change in the law applicable to a
given case prior to a final judgement, the law more favourable to the person
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.,2 96 Likewise, the prin-
ciple of strict construction and the rule of lenity are specifically mandated at
Article 22(2), which states: "The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed
and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall
be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or con-
victed., 2 97 The next section cautions that "[t]his article shall not affect the
290. See Vienna Convention, supra note 127, at art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.").
291. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal onJurisdiction, para. 42 (Oct. 2, 1995) (noting that provisions in human rights treaties are
addressed to national legal systems, not international courts, but conceding that some such provisions
may be binding as general principles of law).
292. UDHR, supra note 10, at pmbl.
293. Early drafts of what became the ICC Statute included the NCSL principle. The 1966 version of
the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind contains a formulation that
references internal law but not international law: "Nothing in this article precludes the trial of anyone
for an act which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal in accordance with internal law or
national law." 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 33, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.52211996.
294. See also ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 8(2)(b) (allowing for the prosecution of war crimes
"within the established framework of international law"); Elements of Crimes, supra note 72, at art.
7(1) ("[C]rimes against humanity ... are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole, warrant and entail individual criminal responsibility, and require conduct which
is impermissible under generally applicable international law, as recognized by the principal legal
systems of the world.").
295. ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 22(1).
296. Id. at art. 24(2).
297. Id. at art. 22(2).
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characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law indepen-
dently of this Statute. 298 As the jurisdiction of the Court is expressly proscrip-
299tive, these provisions will likely be most relevant where amendments to the
Statute are made, such as with the anticipated addition of the crime of aggres-
sion, 3° ° or the less likely addition of the crimes of terrorism or drug trafficking,
as is recommended in Resolution E to the Final Act of the Statute.3 °1 These
provisions will also undoubtedly be invoked where the Court interprets crimes
or defenses in novel or expansive ways to the perceived detriment of a defen-
dant. Collectively, these provisions also make clear that as long as conduct is
criminalized by the ICC Statute, it is of no moment that the relevant domestic
law does not recognize analogous municipal crimes.3 ° 2 In this respect, at least,
the ICC exercises primacy over the domestic legal order.30 3
Although the full scope of the ICC's NCSL provisions remains untested, the
human rights institutions have had occasion to consider the application of the
human rights versions of the NCSL principle to domestic penal proceedings in
states subject to their jurisdiction. The European Court of Human Rights
(European Court), in particular, has developed a methodology for adjudicating
NCSL challenges to domestic prosecutions under Article 7 of its constitutive
298. This provision embodies the idea that the relatively static Statute may not reflect existing CIL
and should not "chill" the continuing process of CIL development. Per Saland, International Criminal
Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 195 (Roy S.
Lee ed., 1999); see also ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 10 ("Nothing in this Part [concerning crimes,
jurisdiction, and admissibility] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.").
299. ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 24 ("No person shall be criminally responsible under this
Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute."),
300. Id. at art. 5(2).
301. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, Annex I, Res. E, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/10 (July 17, 1998).
302. Collectively, these provisions have their roots in predecessors to the ICC Statute that contem-
plated that the court would have jurisdiction by reference over "core" international crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes as defined by customary international law along with certain
enumerated "treaty crimes" derived from discrete multilateral treaties. As originally envisioned, the
ICC's constitutive statute was to be primarily procedural in nature, incorporating general international
law and treaty crimes by reference. Early on, delegates expressed concern that CIL would not define the
relevant crimes as clearly as would be necessary to provide adequate notice to an accused. In addition,
with respect to treaty crimes, they anticipated that it would be necessary to confirm that the treaty was
in force with respect to the relevant states in order for a prosecution to proceed. These concerns led
states to set out definitions of crimes in the Statute rather than refer to crimes by reference. The treaty
crimes eventually either fell out of the Statute, as was the case with terrorism stricto sensu and drug
trafficking, or were incorporated into the core crimes, as was the case with respect to crimes against
internationally protected persons (which are enumerated as war crimes at Article 8(2)(b)(iii)) and
apartheid (which is listed as a crime against humanity at Article 7(1)0)). These developments, coupled
with the court's jurisdiction becoming strictly prospective with respect to the crimes defined within the
Statute, meant that the NCSL provisions lost much of their relevance. See Raul C. Pangalangan, Article
24: Non-Retroactivity Ratione Personae, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMuNAL COURT 467,467-70 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
303. This would have to be the case; otherwise, states would simply legislate impunity. In fact, the
opposite has occurred whereby ICC ratification has spurred a global codification effort as states bring
their domestic legal orders into line with the subject matter jurisdiction and infrastructure of the ICC.
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document, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR), 3° that involves several interrelated inquiries of relevance to
ICL.3 °5 In particular, the European Court will find no violation of Article 7
where a prosecution leaves the basic ingredients of a criminal offense un-
changed, but modifies or abandons non-core elements-such as attendant or
circumstantial elements.3 °6 Under such circumstances, the European Court has
reasoned that the challenged decision has not created a new offense or changed
the basic ingredients of an old offense, but rather has permissibly applied an
established offense to a new situation or context, or changed the jurisdiction in
which such a crime may be adjudicated.3 °7
The European Court will also canvas the applicable domestic legal order to
consider whether developments in the law rendered the challenged interpreta-
tion foreseeable to defendants. This invites reference to non-positive law, as the
European Court has interpreted the term "law" in the ECHR to refer to both
written and unwritten law. 308 More broadly, the European Court will also look
to changes in society that might render an old rule offensive, anachronistic, or
presently unworkable. This is true even when the defendant could not have
304. This provision states:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the
time the criminal offence was committed.
This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according the general
principles of law recognized by civilised nations.
ECPHRFF, supra note 279, at art. 7.
305. This methodology can'be traced, to a certain extent, to the seminal cases of S.W. and C.R. v.
United Kingdom, in which two men argued that they could not be prosecuted for raping their wives in
light of common law marital immunities. The British House of Lords had ruled that the defense was no
longer available in light of changing social, economic, and cultural mores. Considering several trends in
decision in the British courts establishing important exceptions to immunity alongside ongoing legisla-
tive efforts to abolish it, the European Commission on Human Rights held that:
there was a basis on which it could be anticipated [by the applicants] that the courts could
hold that the notional consent of the wife was no longer implied. In particular, given the
recognition by contemporary society of women's equality of status with men in marriage and
outside it and of their autonomy over their own bodies, . . . this adaptation in the application of
the offence of rape was reasonably foreseeable to an applicant with appropriate legal advice.
C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 363, para. 60 (1995).
The European Court affirmed, reasoning that "Article 7... cannot be read as outlawing the gradual
clarification of the rules of criminal liability throughi judicial interpretation from case to case, provided
that the resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be
foreseen." C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 36 (1995).
306. X Ltd. & Y v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8710/79, 28 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 77, 81
(1982) (holding that Article 7 dictates that constitutive elements of an offense (blasphemous libel)
cannot be changed by the courts ex post, although they may be clarified or adapted to new circum-
stances).
307. C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 41 (1995).
308. C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92,21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 363, para. 33 (1995).
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known precisely when the critical societal changes took effect. 3" Where there
is considerable uncertainty or movement in the law, the European Commission
has determined that the populace is essentially on notice that the law is in flux
and could be interpreted adversely to future defendants.31° Contrary judicial
opinions or legislative debate can indicate such instability in the law.3 1
Likewise, the European Court has ruled that a change in the law may be
foreseeable even if an individual has to seek appropriate legal advice to
determine the consequences of her actions. The European Court has noted that
this is especially true with respect to persons carrying on a professional activity
who3 12 "can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the
risk that such activity entails. 313 Individuals in the military are subjected to
such heightened duties in U.S. law. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that
"for the reasons which differentiate military society from civilian society,... Con-
gress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and with greater
flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the former shall be governed
than it is when prescribing rules for the latter.,
314
In terms of determining the accessibility of the relevant rule, the European
Court will look to international law to determine if defendants were on notice
that their conduct was unlawful and potentially sanctionable, as is permitted by
Article 7(2). In the East German Border Guards case,3 15 for example, the
applicants acknowledged that the border policy for which they were convicted
contravened the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) international human
rights treaty obligations, but argued that the relevant human rights treaties
created only state responsibility, not individual criminal responsibility.316 The
European Court ruled that while the GDR could be held responsible for its
treaty violations, individual criminal responsibility for such breaches was also
foreseeable in light of a domestic code provision that "explicitly provided, and
moreover from as long ago as 1968, that individual criminal responsibility was
309. C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 37, 41 (1995).
310. C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 363, para. 41 (1995).
311. See id. para. 59. "
312. Cantoni v. France, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 35 (finding that although the statute in question
was drafted in general terms, the defendant could have foreseen potential liability with the advice of
counsel).
313. Id.
314. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (upholding a military prohibition against "conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" as not unconstitutionally vague).
315. In this case, the applicants were involved at various levels of command in the establishment
and implementation of a system for preventing individuals from crossing the Berlin Wall that involved
the use of anti-personnel mines, automatic fire apparatuses, and a shoot-to-kill policy and that led to the
death or injury of many individuals attempting to cross the border into West Germany. After reunifica-
tion, the German courts convicted the applicants of various forms of homicide, notwithstanding the
defendants' arguments that their actions were sanctioned by extant law allowing for the use of firearms
to prevent the commission of a "serious crime" (that is, fleeing the GDR) and by an official policy of
using deadly force to police the border. Streletz, Kessler & Krenz v. Germany, 2001-1 Eur. Ct. H.R.
230.
316. Id. para. 47.
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to be borne by those who violated the GDR's international obligations or human
rights and fundamental freedoms. 317 Thus, criminal prosecution for these acts
was foreseeable, even absent the unique and probably unforeseeable circum-
stances of a change in regime and German reunification.318 Indeed, the Euro-
pean Court also ratified a related case in which a lowly border guard was
charged with knowing that the conduct in question infringed fundamental
human rights.319 A concurring opinion in the Streletz case argued that it was
necessary to find that international law made the conduct in question a penal
offense and concluded that the acts for which the applicants had been convicted
constituted crimes against humanity under general principles of CIL.32 ° With
this additional step in the reasoning, the concurring judge found no breach.
Likewise, in Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, the applicants had been convicted of
crimes against humanity (specifically the crime of deportation) for acts alleged
to have been committed in 1949 under an Estonian penal code provision
enacted in 1994.321 Noting that the Estonian Constitution recognizes interna-
tional law as "an inseparable part of the Estonian legal system," the domestic
courts had ruled that international law criminalized crimes against humanity by
1949, as reflected in the Nuremberg Statute and the General Assembly's affirma-
tion of the Nuremberg Principles in 1946 by Resolution 95(1).322 The domestic
courts so ruled notwithstanding that the Estonian Constitution also included an
unequivocal version of the NCSL provision 323 and that the acts in question
would not have satisfied the "war nexus" requirement originally included within
the definition of crimes against humanity.324 In rejecting the applicant's Article
7 challenge, the European Court noted that even if the acts in question might
have been lawful according to Soviet law (which was in force in Estonia at the
time), they constituted crimes against humanity under international law at the
time of their commission, especially given that the Soviet Union was a founding
member of the Nuremberg Charter.325
The European Court has also noted that there are times when criminal rules
must be drafted in general terms or when there may be a "penumbra of doubt"
317. Id. para. 104. Indeed, the Court noted that the applicants could not rely on the existence of a
policy that contravened international law and "objective justice." Id. paras. 47, 87.
318. Id. para. 84.
319. K.-H. W. v. Germany, App. No. 37201/97, paras. 14, 17 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 22, 2001),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&
highlight= GERMANY&sessionid= 10570468&skin=hudoc-en.
320. Streletz, 2001-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 230 (Loucaides, J., concurring).
321. Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, App. Nos. 23052/04 & 24018/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu/kolk.html.
322. Id. § A.
323. See id. (citing Article 23(1) of the Estonian Constitution, which states that "[n]o one shall be
convicted of an act which did not constitute a criminal offence under the law in force at the time the act
was committed").
324. Id. For a discussion of the "war nexus" requirement, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
325. See also Papon v. France (No. 2), 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 235; Touvier v. France, App. No.
29420/95, 88-B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 148, 161 (1997).
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at the fringes of a penal definition.3 26 Such statutes do not necessarily offend the
principle of specificity inherent in Article 7 as long as the statute "is sufficiently
clear in the large majority of cases. 327 Finally, where conduct is malum in se as
opposed to malum prohibitum, such as the "essentially debasing" rape in
question in C.R., the European Court will determine that the applicant could not
have reasonably believed that his conduct was lawful.32 8 The European Court
considers that extending liability in such situations is in keeping with the
fundamental objectives of the ECHR-respect for human dignity and human
rights.329 All told, where judicial developments are consistent with the "es-
sence" of an offence and could have been reasonably foreseen by the applicant,
the prosecution is not "arbitrary"-the specific evil that Article 7 is designed to
protect against.33
In 2007, the European Court interpreted Article 7 in the context of ICL with
respect to the domestic genocide prosecution of Nikola Jorgi6 in Germany.
331
After exhausting his domestic remedies, Jorgi6 challenged his prosecution and
conviction before the European Court, claiming that his prosecution violated
several provisions of the European Convention: his right to a fair trial before a
tribunal "established by law" (Article 6(1)), his right to liberty and security
(Article 5(1)), and his right to be free from ex post facto prosecution (Article 7).
With regard to the ex post facto claim, Jorgi6 argued that the German courts had
expansively construed the genocide prohibition beyond the contours of positive
law. In particular, Jorgi6 took issue with the German Constitutional Court's
reasoning that the intent to destroy the group included the intent to destroy the
group as a social unit, short of its physical or biological destruction.
The European Court ruled that the German courts' interpretation was both in
keeping with the "essence of the offense" 332 and could reasonably have been
foreseen at the material time by the applicant with the assistance of counsel.333
Because this was the first prosecution under the German law, the European
Court looked to other authorities to conclude that the defendant could not
reasonably rely upon the more narrow interpretation of German law for which
he was advocating.334 For one, the European Court determined that several
aspects of the actus reus of genocide do not require the physical or biological
326. Cantoni v. France, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 32; see also Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No.
14307/88, para. 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 25, 1993), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item= 1 &portal =hbkm&action=html&highlight=Greece%20%7C%2OKokkinais&sessionid=
10572462&skin=hudoc-en.
327. Cantoni, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 32.
328. C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 42 (1995).
329. Id.
330. Id. para. 32.
331. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
332. Jorgi6 v. Germany, App. No. 74613/01, paras. 103-08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 12, 2007), available
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item= I &portal= hbkm&action = html&highlight= 74613/
01&sessionid=8779548&skin=hudoc-en.
333. Id. para. 113.
334. Id. paras. 109-10.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 97 Geo. L.J. 181 2008-2009
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
destruction of the group, so the German court's interpretation found support in
the text of the law. 335 In addition, the European Court determined that Jorgi.
could have foreseen the more expansive interpretation of the provision in light
of the work of several German scholars advancing such an interpretation and a
degree of uncertainty in the law on this point.336 The fact that the ICTY took a
narrower approach to cultural genocide in the Krsti6 case 3 3 7 was of no moment,
because that case post-dated defendant's conviction and could not contribute to
his reasonable expectations at the time he acted.33 8 Thus, the European Court
determined that the German courts enjoyed a margin of appreciation under the
Convention to adopt the interpretation of the genocide prohibition that they saw
fit without running afoul of Article 7.339
The Jorgie case, emanating as it does from an authoritative institution
charged with interpreting human rights protections, provides a useful frame-
work for evaluating the legal innovations advanced by the ICL tribunals dis-
cussed above.340 As a threshold matter, a distinction can be made within the
modem cases between proceedings before the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, on the
one hand, and "historical justice" cases before domestic courts or the ECCC, on
the other. For the most part, the former's jurisprudence is on firmer footing, as
some of the relevant developments in the law had been in full swing by the time
the defendants acted and these tribunals began operating. Indeed, the ICTY
Statute was promulgated in the midst of the war in the former Yugoslavia,
arguably providing unimpeachable notice to defendants acting after the Tribu-
nal's establishment and early expansive rulings. With historical justice cases
arising out of the Cold War era, when relevant developments in international
law were only just in motion at the time the defendants acted, the NCSL
challenge may be more acute.
The most important ICL innovations include the establishment of a comprehen-
sive penal regime for all armed conflicts, the knitting together of different
strands of ICL (especially IHL stricto sensu and the "human rights crimes" of
genocide and crimes against humanity), the application of all forms of criminal
responsibility to all substantive crimes, an expansive approach to adding content
to residual or nebulous clauses and heretofore unconstrued enumerated crimes,
335. Id. paras. 104-05.
336. Id. paras. 47, 111.
337. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 25 (Aug. 2, 2001) (rejecting
cognizability of cultural genocide).
338. Jorgi6 v. Germany, App. No. 74613/01, para. 112 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 12, 2007), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkpl97/view.asp?item= 1 &portal= hbkm&action =html&highlight = 74613/
01&sessionid = 8779548&skin=hudoc-en.
339. Id. para. 114.
340. It should be noted that the ECHR cases hinge to a certain degree on the recognition by the
European Court of a margin of appreciation for states codifying international crimes and interpreting
domestic or international law. The European Court's role is "confined to ascertaining whether the
effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention." Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, App.
Nos. 23052/04 & 24018/04, § C (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.derechos.org/
nizkor/impu/kolk.html.
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and the de-emphasis of precision in the circumstantial elements of crimes. From
this baseline, it is possible to determine to what extent more particular innova-
tions discussed above in Part III could have been foreseen by today's defendants
such that they could have ascertained how to avoid prosecution and to what
extent the new tribunals have remained faithful to the essence of offenses established
during the postwar period and in subsequent treaty-drafting exercises.
Key developments prior to the establishment of the two ad hoc criminal
tribunals put defendants on fair notice of the possibility of criminal liability for
abusive practices and expansive forms of liability committed within a range of
circumstances. Foremost among these developments was the introduction and
near-universal acceptance of international human rights concepts in the global
consciousness of the post-WWII period.34 ' The identification of these norms as
jus cogens and/or erga omnes obligations speaks to their potency and the fact
that they reflect values deemed essential to the peaceful coexistence of human-
kind. Most of the key human rights treaties were in place prior to the establish-
ment of the first ad hoc tribunals and the events that gave rise to the historical
justice cases."' Although addressed primarily to state actors and collective
(state) responsibility, these human rights treaties signaled that certain conduct
was internationally and universally proscribed.3" 3 These treaties proscribe a
range of undesirable conduct, the most egregious segment of which involves
violations of individuals' rights to physical integrity and security and constitutes
the modern international crimes. Accordingly, where there is a lack of total
certainty at the edges of a particular criminal prohibition, the prior existence of
a corresponding human rights prohibition provides fair warning of potential
penal liability. Moreover, by expressly regulating conduct within the borders of
a single state, these international human rights treaties have indelibly adjusted
state and individual expectations about the level of protection afforded by state
sovereignty against international scrutiny of internal affairs. In this regard, the
ICTY has specifically noted that a "[s]tate-sovereignty-oriented approach has
been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach." 344
341. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modem Approaches to Customary International
Law: Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. Irr'L L. 757, 778 (2001) (identifying "commonly held subjective values
about right and wrong that have been adopted by a representative majority of states in treaties and
declarations").
342. Important treaties embodying these values are the 1948 Genocide Convention; the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1984 Torture
Convention, the regional human rights conventions, and the various nondiscrimination conventions.
343. Many human rights treaties envision the state (via state actors and governmental policies) as
primarily responsible for rights violations, and thus the source of recompense. See, e.g., Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 14, G.A. Res.
39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex 39, Supp.No. 51, U.N. Doe. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter Torture Convention]. The most extreme human rights abuses have also been embodied in
penal treaties-such as the Genocide, Geneva, and Torture Conventions-which envision both state and
individual criminal responsibility.
344. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 97 (Oct. 2, 1995).
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These human rights instruments also reflect increased international expecta-
tions of individual accountability for international law violations345 and gave
rise to the movement for redress for victims. 346 These treaties obligate states to
both respect and ensure the rights contained within them, which implicates both
state and non-state action.347 In joining human rights treaties, states have
pledged to, among other things, enact legislation, create institutions to enforce
human rights norms, protect the rights of victims of human rights violations,
and cooperate in the detection and prosecution of persons suspected of having
committed such crimes. In keeping with these overarching duties, these treaties
and declarations obligate states to provide victims with legal redress, judicial
access, and an enforceable right to fair and/or adequate compensation. Specifi-
cally, a right to reparations on the part of victims of human rights violations
appears in numerous multilateral instruments. For example, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, 34 8 the ICCPR,349 the American Convention, 350 and the
Torture Convention351 all require states to provide effective remedies within
their national courts for victims of violations of fundamental rights guaranteed
by those instruments. In addition, many of the human rights treaties allow for
the exercise of universal and other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, signal-
ing the importance of ensuring worldwide penal accountability for violations.352
345. See Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punish-
ment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), at 78,
U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 3, 1973); Question of the
Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A.
Res. 2840 (XXVI), at 88, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 18, 1971)
(affirming that "refusal by States to co-operate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of persons
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity is contrary to the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and to generally recognized norms of international law"); Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970).
346. See Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A.
Res. 40/34, at 213, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 96th plen. mtg., Annex, Agenda Item 5, Supp. No. 53, U.N.
Doc. A/40/53 (Nov. 29, 1985) ("Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be established and
strengthened where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress through formal or informal proce-
dures .
347. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 279, at art. 2(1).
348. UDHR, supra note 10, at art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law.").
349. ICCPR, supra note 279, at art. 2(3).
350. The American Convention obliges signatories to ensure that every person has the right to a
hearing to determine his rights and obligations of a civil nature. American Convention, supra note 279,
at art. 8(1).
351. Torture Convention, supra note 343, at art. 14. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to acts
of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment that may fall short of torture: "the
obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to
torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. at art.
16.
352. See, e.g., id. at arts. 5-7 (obliging states parties to prosecute or extradite individuals accused of
committing torture).
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The rejection of domestic amnesty laws by international institutions 353 and
statutes of limitation for international crimes 354 furthers this trend toward
placing a high premium on accountability for rights violations.
In terms of the context in which international crimes may be committed, the
Cold War spawned developments in the nature of armed conflicts that included
a decline in strictly international wars, a rise of civil and other non-international
wars, and the internationalization of internal conflicts through proxy warfare.
This splintering of conflict classification strained the relevance and durability of
negotiated distinctions within the IHL of the norms applicable to the various
categories of armed conflict.3 5 5 Common Article 3 and Protocol 11-although
silent as to penal sanctions-reflect early concern with abuses committed in
non-international armed conflicts, and their negotiation histories suggest a trend
in legal development toward a notion of war crimes committed outside of
international armed conflicts.35 6 In any case, the changing nature of armed
conflict, coupled with the human rights regime's incursions into state sover-
eignty, would have given notice of the likelihood that the well-developed norms
governing international armed conflicts would eventually extend to non-
international armed conflicts and that a regime of penal responsibility for such
conflicts was inevitable and imminent. The reinvigoration of the process toward
building a permanent international criminal court resulted in negotiations that began to
collapse legal distinctions between the categories of war crimes in many key areas.-
Collectively, these developments--coupled with the development of a human rights
regime that applies in times of peace and war-forecast that conflict classification
would become less relevant to assigning individual liability for abuses.
The reinvigoration of the International Law Commission's project on establish-
ing a permanent international criminal court in the mid-1980s launched the ICL
renaissance.357 Many of the draft statutes generated during this period of time
353. See Garay Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/96, OEA/Ser.L./
V.I.95, doc. 7 rev. 156 (1997) (finding Chilean amnesty law incompatible with IACHR obligations to
ensure victim redress).
354. See, e.g., Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), at 40, Annex, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 18, U.N.
Doc. A17218 (Nov. 26, 1968); see also ECCC Statute, supra note 180, at arts. 3-5 (extending the statute
of limitations for domestic crimes and noting that international crimes have no statutes of limitations);
Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, App. Nos. 23052/04 & 24018/04, § C (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.derechos.orgI/nizkor/impu/kolk.html (noting that crimes against humanity and
war crimes have no statute of limitation).
355. See Prosecutor v. Delalid, Mucid, Deli6 & Landlo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 301
(Nov. 16, 1998) ("[T]he prevalence of armed conflicts within the confines of one State or emerging
from the breakdown of previous State boundaries is apparent and absent the necessary conditions for
the creation of a comprehensive new law by means of a multilateral treaty, the more fluid and adaptable
concept of customary international law takes the fore.").
356. See Deidre Willmott, Removing the Distinction Between International and Non-International
Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 5 MELa. J. INT'L L. 196,
199-204 (2004).
357. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-l-T, Opinion and Judgment, para. 655 (May 7, 1997)
(citing the work of the International Law Commission as evidence of CIL).
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contemplated more expansive crimes against humanity and war crimes provi-
sions than had been employed during the WWII period. In these negotiations,
states indicated a willingness to revisit issues that had been foreclosed in prior
multilateral negotiation exercises, such as a penal regime for non-international
armed conflicts. 358 The "re-discovery" of crimes against humanity signaled a
more robust regime of ICL that would address situations of internal tyranny and
state-sponsored repression. Revived formulations of the crime did not depend
on the existence of a state of war (as is required for war crimes), or some
protected status of the victim or heightened mens rea (as are required for
genocide). As a result, the ground was laid for crimes against humanity to
operate as an umbrella crime with clear analogs in established domestic crimes
for which advance notice of proscription would be unequivocal.359
Although just as much of a legal fiction in international law as it is in
domestic law, if not more so, individuals may be charged with ICL omniscience.
The foregoing developments in domestic law, human rights, IHL, and ICL made
it clear at the outset of the ICL renaissance that much of the conduct in question
in the modern cases was already proscribed, even if there was no direct treaty
provision on point. Accordingly, individuals have not been prosecuted or con-
victed of conduct that they could not reasonably have understood to be pro-
scribed with the assistance of counsel. In most cases, with the child soldiers
case as a possible exception, new constructions were not "unexpected" or
"indefensible" by reference to the extant domestic and international law and
basic values concerning how humans should act towards each other.
Even where modern courts have taken some liberties with the content of the
applicable substantive law in betrayal of the NCSL principle, they have to a
certain extent mitigated the harm to defendants by remaining more faithful to
the gist of NCSL's sentencing counterpart-nulla poena sine lege.36° In particu-
lar, defendants before the ad hoc tribunals are generally (although not always)
sentenced in keeping with the domestic law in place at the time they acted and
not pursuant to any fixed schedule of penalties associated with particular
international crimes. The architects of the ICTY initiated this practice with
Article 24(1) of the Tribunal's Statute, which provides that the Tribunal shall
"have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts
of the former Yugoslavia" in determining the terms of imprisonment.3 6 ' The
358. Prosecutor v. Furundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, para. 227 (Dec. 10, 1998) (noting
that "the Rome Statute by and large may be taken as constituting an authoritative expression of the
legal views of a great number of States").
359. See Tomuschat, supra note 14, at 834 (noting that crimes against humanity are "an amalgam-
ation of the core substance of criminal law to be encountered in the criminal codes of all 'civilized'
nations").
360. A strict application of nulla poena sine lege dictates a published schedule of penalties, a feature
of many civil law systems.
361. ICTY Statute, supra note 152, at art. 24(1); see also Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, rule 101(B)(iii), U.N. Doc IT/32/rev.38
(June 13, 2007) (reiterating requirement that the Trial Chamber consider the general practice regarding
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same approach is mandated before the Rwanda Tribunal.362 The base sentence
is then subjected to adjustment in light of aggravating and mitigating factors
associated with the particular circumstances of the defendant, the form or
degree of involvement in the crime, and the gravity of the conduct in ques-
363tion.
In Furund~ija, for example, the Trial Chamber characterized the defendant's
actions as rape, rather than as sexual assault (which is how his conduct would
have been characterized by the domestic courts of the former Yugoslavia). In so
ruling, the Trial Chamber made a distinction between the aggravated character-
ization of the offense for the purposes of charging and conviction and the
concomitant sentence, which was to be in accordance with the sentencing
practice of the former Yugoslavia. 36 Thus, as long as the sentence was in
alignment with the national practice, the Tribunal found no adverse conse-
quence of the act being characterized as rape rather than assault under ICL other
than the potential heightened stigma associated with such a designation. With
respect to the stigma factor, the Trial Chamber concluded that "any such
concern is amply outweighed by the fundamental principle of protecting human
dignity, a principle which favours broadening the definition of rape. 36 5
The particular crime classification employed may thus assert fewer tangible
impacts on a defendant where the tribunal calibrates the sentence based on the
gravity of the conduct in question, or analogous sentences under domestic law,
and not its precise legal categorization before the international tribunal. 36 6 This
is not to say classification is without any effect; the degree of stigma associated
with different international crimes varies as observers instinctively assume a
hierarchy of crimes with genocide at the apex followed by crimes against
humanity and war crimes, in that order.367 As was seen in the Furund~ija
decision, tribunals tend to de-emphasize the impact of such expressive functions
prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia). The ICTY and ICTR RPE also set forth some
aggravating and mitigating factors that may be considered in sentencing convicted defendants.
362. ICTR Statute, supra note 180, at art. 23.
363. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Plavgid, Case No. IT-00-39/40-T, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 21, 25
(Feb. 27, 2003). o
364. Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/l-T, Judgment, para. 184 (Dec. 10, 1998).
365. But see Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, para. 398 (Nov. 30, 2006) ("IT]he
International Tribunal, while bound to take the sentencing law and practice of the former Yugoslavia
into account, does not have to follow it.").
366. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Li, para. 19 (Oct. 7, 1997) (arguing "that the gravity of a criminal act, and consequently the seriousness
of its punishment, are determined by the intrinsic nature of the act itself and not by its classification
under one category or another").
367. See Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, paras. 26-27 (finding defendant's original
guilty plea to be uninformed because defendant was unaware that crimes against humanity were a more
serious offense than war crimes); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-I, Judgment, para. 981
(Jan. 27, 2000) ("[G]enocide constitutes the 'crime of crimes,' which must be taken into account when
deciding the sentence."). See generally Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415 (2001) (arguing that the chapeau elements
of international crimes allow for the grading of offenses for sentencing purposes).
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of the law when considering the legality of a particular characterization.
This referential approach was not built into the ICC process, although it was
considered.368 Instead, the ICC Statute provision entitled "nulla poena sine
lege" provides laconically that "[a] person convicted by the Court may be
punished only in accordance with this Statute., 369 This undoubtedly refers to
the type of penalties allowed, including imprisonment up to thirty years or life
imprisonment for extremely grave crimes, fines, forfeiture, 370 and various forms
of reparation and restitution.371 The specific sentencing provisions provide only
that "the Court shall... take into account such factors as the gravity of the
crime[,] the individual circumstances of the convicted persons"'372 and "the
evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant to
the sentence., 373 Drafters adopted this approach to enable judicial flexibility
and discretion and to promote "equality of justice" so that all defendants before
the ICC would be subjected to uniform penalties, regardless of the place of
commission or nationality of the relevant parties.374
Nonetheless, the ICC would do well to consider adopting the ICTY/R
approach where appropriate and to apply the principle of lenity at the time of
sentencing in the event that the judges engage in more expansive juridical
interpretations that may run counter to the domestic law to which defendants
would otherwise be subject. Relying upon existing penalties for the same or
analogous crimes in place in the locus commissi delicti can minimize the
tangible impact of retroactive adjudication.375 This approach should give way,
however, where such penalties would be grossly disproportionate to the offense
in question because the local law is weak or underdeveloped. Where national
systems do not include a specific schedule of penalties associated with the
commission of particular crimes, the ICC can look to the sentencing practices of
the triers of fact to calibrate a punishment that fits the facts and to ensure that
defendants are not unduly prejudiced by novel or expansive interpretations of
the law.
368. Early in the process of drafting the ICC Statute, it was envisioned that the international court
would take into account the penalties provided in applicable national law (for example, the territorial or
nationality state) to serve as guidance. William A. Schabas, Article 23: Nulla Poena Sine Lege, in
CoMENTrARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INrERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 463, 464 (Otto Triffterer ed.,
1999). There was even talk of drafting a more detailed schedule of penalties along the line of civil law
jurisdictions, but in the end, these options were abandoned in favor of a more untethered approach. Id.
at 465-66.
369. ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 23.
370. Id. at art. 77 (setting forth available penalties).
371. Id. at art. 75 (providing for victim reparation).
372. Id. at art. 78(1).
373. Id. at art. 76(1).
374. Rolf Einar Fife, Article 77: Applicable Penalties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CjaNAL COURT 985, 986, 989-90 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
375. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah, para. 85 (Oct. 7, 1997) (noting that sentencing provides a "sophisticated and
flexible" tool to do justice in particular cases).
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CONCLUSION
Innovative judges and expansive legal interpretations are not unique or
endemic to ICL. Like all incipient areas of law, the development of ICL has
proceeded asymptotically: early cases addressed vast open areas in legal doc-
trine. Today's cases address issues that are more nuanced, involving the resolu-
tion of more micro irregularities and the filling in of increasingly smaller
gaps.376 Although codification will never be complete, the rate of change is
slowing significantly. As a maturing system of law, most of the next phase of
the evolution of ICL will happen at the outer edges of doctrine, where the
implications of new ideas are perhaps less dramatic. As a result, there will be
less and less space for judges to build upon the ICL edifice.
Going forward, unless the international community creates more ad hoc and
hybrid courts, international prosecutions will increasingly proceed exclusively
before the ICC, as the ad hoc Tribunals implement their Completion Strategies
and the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone winds down. The ICC is
governed by a robust NCSL provision that prohibits not only the retroactive
application of law but also mandates strict construction in favor of the defen-
dant. In addition, Article 21 sets forth a hierarchy of sources that may limit the
Court's ability to refer to more expansive customary international law. 377 That
said, there are "legality deficits" within the Statute, as many crimes are vaguely
or sparingly worded and key terms remain undefined,378 notwithstanding the
Elements of Crimes. 37 9 As the ICC begins to issue substantive decisions and
judgments, the new court will undoubtedly be faced with the pressure to
innovate. It remains to be seen 380 to what extent the NCSL provisions will truly
cabin the ability and proclivity of the court to adopt expansive or novel
interpretations to crimes within its jurisdiction or to assert jurisdiction over
crimes that states purposefully excluded from its jurisdiction, such as acts of
376. Dworkin would employ a tree metaphor to describe this process, whereby the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals provided ICL's trunk and the modem tribunals, perched on ever narrower branches,
are making increasingly minor refinements and subinterpretations of the basic doctrines. RONALD
DwoRriN, LAW'S EMPIRE 70 (1986).
377. ICC Statute, supra note 72, at art. 21. This Article directs the Court to apply, in the first place,
the Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence; in the second place, "applicable
treaties and the principles and rules of international law"; and, in the third place, "general principles of
law... derived from national law[]." It has been presumed that "principles and rules of international
law" refers to international customary law, although the formulation is ambiguous. See Margaret
McAuliffe deGuzman, Article 21: Applicable Law, in CoMMENTARY ON THE RoME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL COURT 435, 441-42 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
378. Perceived vagueness in definition is one of the reasons articulated by the United States for
opposing the court. See John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court
from an American Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 186, 189 (2000).
379. See David Hunt, The International Criminal Court: High Hopes, "Creative Ambiguity" and an
Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. INT'L L. CRnI. JUST. 56, 60 (2004) (opining that the
Elements of Crime-"an overwhelming exercise of legal positivism"-will have the effect of "stultify-
ing further growth in the law").
380. See Wessel, supra note 132, at 414 ("[It is unrealistic in light of history to expect nullum
crimen sine lege to significantly restrain judicial policy-making at the ICC.").
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Beyond the ICC, situations remain in which innovation is possible and will
be tempting. For example, the ECCC will have to determine the state of ICL in
the 1975-79 period, when the Khmer Rouge were in power.383 Many develop-
ments in the law of crimes against humanity and genocide most relevant to the
Khmer Rouge era are the result of the work of the two ad hoc tribunals in the
late 1990s. These include the almost complete convergence of the law on war
crimes relevant to international and non-international armed conflicts, the offi-
cial abandonment of a "war nexus" for crimes against humanity, and the
adoption of the subjective approach to protected group identity and membership
for the crime of genocide.384
Where the defense of NCSL will likely retain its greatest currency going
forward will be in domestic proceedings, especially where courts adjudicating
historical justice cases must decide what law to apply to events that antedated or
were contemporaneous with the ICL renaissance. In connection with their
ratification of the ICC Statute, states are increasingly incorporating international
crimes into their domestic penal codes. Such crimes are often subject to
universal jurisdiction, granting domestic courts an expansive extraterritorial
reach. Indeed, there will undoubtedly be additional efforts to apply these new
statutes to conduct that predated codification. Such retroactive justice is enabled
by the trend among courts to extend, toll, or altogether abolish statutes of
limitation for international crimes.385 Spain has been particularly active in
litigating cases arising out of the repressive regimes in Latin America during the
Cold War and elsewhere. NCSL may exert greater resistance in domestic
prosecutions than it does in international ones where domestic courts are bound
by constitutional articulations of the principle and where courts may not be able
to rely upon the varied sources of international law for applicable rules of
decision.386
381. See, e.g., Vincent-Joel Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
in the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity?, 19
AM. U. INT'L L. Rav. 1009, 1022-25 (2004).
382. See, e.g., Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond
Crisis Situations, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1257, 1257-58 (2007).
383. See ECCC Statute, supra note 180, at art. 2 (limiting the ECCC's temporal jurisdiction to
crimes committed during the period of April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979).
384. A hybrid court to consider terrorist acts in Lebanon is in the process of being established. See
Detlev Mehlis, Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission Established Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1595, para. 5, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/662
(Oct. 20, 2005) (proposing the establishment of such a court). The contemplated subject matter
jurisdiction includes crimes of terrorism, for which there is no omnibus international definition. The
statute for that tribunal, however, defines terrorism solely in reference to Lebanese domestic law. It is
unclear how influential international law will be in those proceedings. See Statute of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, art. 2, Attachment, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).
385. See supra note 354.
386. Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, ainovi6 & Ojdani6, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub
Ojdanid's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 39, (May 21, 2003) (noting
that international law is "'the product of multipartite treaties, conventions, judicial decisions and
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The NCSL dilemma also remains relevant for idiosyncratic or expansive
interpretations of established law, along the line of the Jorgie case. In addition,
in the United States, the military-commission scheme envisioned by the Bush
Administration contemplates assertions of jurisdiction over a number of crimes,38 7
newly designated as war crimes, that do not find expression in ICL, IHL, or
domestic law, such as "material support for terrorism" or the crime of con-
spiracy as a substantive offense.388 Still, ICL is not likely to repeat the dramatic
evolution it underwent in the last two decades.
ICL began with a bang in the post-WWII period as the framers of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals created two new offenses--crimes against the
peace and against humanity-to supplement established, yet ultimately defi-
cient, war crimes prohibitions. These jurists assumed that their efforts would be
made permanent through the -creation of new positive law and permanent
institutions. This was not to be. Impatient in the face of continued atrocities and
states' dogged unwillingness to align law with morality and justice better, and
pressed with the need to take principled action, modem international judges
have sacrificed the strict application of NCSL to fashion the moral universe for
the future international order that was envisioned during the momentous post-
war period. There is no question that the lines of reasoning employed in the
cases discussed above occasionally produced substantive justice at the expense
of strict legality. Yet, even if the analytical claims employed in individual cases
are not always fully satisfactory or persuasive, the results obtained for the
system as a whole ensure that tomorrow's defendants cannot credibly claim they
did not know that their acts of mass murder and mayhem were crimes under
international law.
Just as common law crimes once flourished in England and the new Ameri-
can colonies, similar processes have been at work in ICL. And just as common
law crimes eventually dissipated389 in the face of virtually complete codifica-
* 390 wltion, so too will the common law of ICL become less necessary, prevalent,
and relevant. And yet, in ICL, this integration and stabilization of the law has
been driven less by assertions of legislative primacy, as happened in the
common law context, and more as a result of international courts aggressively
customs which have received international acceptance or acquiescence' rather than a set of statutes
adopted by one sovereign authority, as in national systems") (quoting the Justice Case, supra note 15).
387. See Military Commission Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 950v(b)(25) (2006 & Supp. 2007).
388. See United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Ex Post Facto) 5-6 (July 14, 2008)
(holding that the conspiracy and material support for terrorism crimes did not violate the ex post facto
prohibition because they were pre-existing offenses under the common law of war) (draft on file with
The Georgetown Law Journal).
389. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (abolishing notion of
federal common law crimes and declaring that all federal crimes must be proscribed by statute to be
punishable). For a history of this transition, see WAYNE R. LAFAvE, 1 SUBsTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1
(2d ed. 2007).
390. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
Rav. 189, 202 (1985) (noting that, in the United States, "penal legislation exists in such abundance that
wholesale judicial creativity is simply unnecessary").
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flexing their jurisprudential muscles in the face of legislative debility. Interna-
tional judges, it turns out, are better able to represent the moral condemnation of
the international community than are states engaged in multilateral negotiations
with their own interests-including ensuring impunity-at heart. And so, where
the law was silent, it was made to speak. These jurisprudential developments
were then codified by states in the ICC Statute, which is serving as the
inspiration and impetus for the domestication of ICL norms. In this global
codification process, states cannot claim to start with a blank slate; rather, many
of the broad contours of the law have been sketched out for them by the
jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals and their progeny. Positive law, in the form of
the ICC Statute, now reflects developments in the law made at the expense of
perfect legal certainty. Now that the universe of international criminal law has
settled in, the need for expansive interpretation is diminishing and the full
complement of the principle of legality can take root.
Since its genesis, ICL has been buffeted by powerful crosscurrents. The first
is a humanitarian impulse that was stimulated in the post-WWII period and that
animated the United Nations project and the human rights movement. This
period, coming as it did in the wake of the unprecedented atrocities of WWII,
constitutes a veritable constitutional moment 391 in international law. The second
current is the enduring principle of state sovereignty, which renders states
anxious to shield their agents and internal events from international scrutiny and
censure. Perhaps more than any other area of public international law, ICL
reflects the perennial struggle between the "is" and the "ought" and between
positivism and normativity. In the still-primitive state of international law,
where what positive law exists is often the product of self-interested negotiation
and compromise and where consistent enforcement remains elusive, courts have
seized the opportunity to swim in normative waters. Although international law
is arguably an instrument of international relations ostensibly made by and for
states, ICL has risen above its progenitors and embarked upon a path of its own,
guided by judicial discourse. So far, in the struggle between apology and utopia
being waged in the field of international law as first identified by Finnish
scholar Martti Koskenniemi,3 92 the utopians emerge dominant in international
criminal law.
391. Bruce Ackerman uses the term "constitutional moment" in the context of liberal revolutions.
See BRUCE Acl mAN, THE FUTrURt OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 46-54 (1992). According to Ackerman, this
moment is essentially a window of opportunity for "a collective effort both to frame... fundamental
principles and to mobilize broad popular support for... crucial initiatives." Id. at 49.
392. MARrn KOSKENNEM, BETwEEN APOLOGY AND UTOPIA: THm STRUCTRE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT (2005) (noting the tension in international law between descriptive theories that accurately
convey how states behave and normative ones that hinge on principles of justice that should govern
international relations).
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